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Why do some companies release more methane than others? Using a mixed methods 
approach, I explore this question by analyzing variation in Texas oil and gas extraction facility 
venting and flaring practices. The methane emissions from oil and gas venting and flaring 
contribute to global climate change, making the practice a growing concern. Using an open 
systems organizational theory approach, I develop a conceptual model to explain how 
organizational power relates to methane emissions from venting and flaring by the oil and gas 
extraction industry. I test the conceptual model with several sources of data and analyses. First, I 
analyze archival information to show how, due to direct involvement of powerful oil and gas 
companies, policy changed to increase the legal opportunities for companies to vent or flare gas. 
Second, drawing upon quantitative environmental justice research methods, I create a geographic 
information system to examine how community inequality is related to environmental inequality. 
Third, I analyze a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model that demonstrates that 
extreme venting and flaring is associated with low poverty, less politically organized, and 
predominately Hispanic neighborhoods. Finally, I explore the effects of the organizational 
characteristics of facilities, the companies that directly own them, and the political legal 
environment in which they are embedded on the environmental efficiency of facility operations 
through a clustered two-part hurdle regression model. I find subsidiary organizations are more 
prone to pollution because there is a liability firewall that protects ultimate parent companies 
from possible social repercussions. Findings suggest political and organizational power are key 
factors contributing to the environmental decisions of organizations. By enacting new state 
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1. INTRODUCTION- A BURNING ISSUE: FLARING AND VENTING IN TEXAS 
 
“It doesn’t have to be like this, but the excuses for flaring are all too familiar. 
The gas price is too low, pipelines are too expensive, upfront costs to use or 
convert the gas locally are too high. And the excuses will keep coming until we 
finally face reality: We cannot drill our way out of the coming climate crises… 
It is time to face the issues of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from 
oil and gas exploration. Too much time and energy, literally, have already been 
wasted.” (Schade 2014) 
Although air pollution in the United States has steadily declined over the last four 
decades, rural air pollution in the United States has been increasing over the same time period 
due to oil and gas industry flaring and venting practices. Venting and flaring is an often-
unnecessary practice of the oil and gas extraction process. Natural gas and oil are produced on a 
construction area known as a drilling pad using one or more drilling rigs on top of one or more 
holes in the ground, known as wells. When oil and gas is extracted from a well, natural gas can 
be released or leaked into the air (a practice known as venting) or burned and released into the 
atmosphere using a flare stack (a practice known as flaring). While some venting and flaring 
practices are necessary during emergencies and accidents, routine venting and flaring practices 
are a choice by oil and gas companies. While routine venting and flaring is banned throughout 





In order to avoid routine flaring practices, companies must invest in green technologies 
and infrastructures. Even though natural gas has economic and use value, since it is a legal 
option, many companies choose to not build pipeline infrastructures or, when pipeline is 
otherwise unavailable, fail to rent or buy the equipment necessary to collect and store extracted 
natural gas until the pipeline is constructed or it is transported to consumers by other means, and 
instead dispose of the gas by venting or flaring. Venting and flaring is a growing concern 
because in addition to wasting a valuable, finite natural resource, it creates air pollution and 
emits greenhouse gasses that contribute to global climate change.  
 
1.1 Common Explanations of Flaring and Venting 
 
Although natural gas extracted along with oil and other petrochemicals at extraction sites 
has economic value, companies may directly choose to vent or flare for three primary reasons. 
First, it is common for operators to flare gas the first few days after drilling is completed in order 
to test the pressure and composition of extracted natural resources. However, some other 
companies choose to forgo this unnecessary waste and instead use portable green completion 
equipment. Second, since wells must go through a costly process to be shut-in1, operators flare 
gas to maintain a safe pressure during emergencies and repairs. Third, out of perceived economic 
                                                 
1 Shutting in a well is a process by which a well is plugged at a specified level and filled with 
concrete to prevent natural gas from escaping. Depending on the depth of the well, shut in 




interests and administrative costs, some companies choose to immediately vent and flare 
extracted natural gas, rather than invest in and build the infrastructure and technology necessary 
to effectively capture, store, and transport the gas to be sold on the market. While oil and gas 
extraction industry venting and flaring practices are often viewed as a natural part of the 
production process, I argue that there is a social component in both corporate choices to vent and 
flare and the normal accidents that lead to venting and flaring. 
 
Figure 1. Gas Flare in Permian Basin  
 






1.2 Modern Venting and Flaring Patterns in Texas 
 
As fracking technologies have opened up oil and gas development in previously 
unreachable areas, the practice of venting and flaring has become a growing economic concern 
for states with finite oil and gas reserves.  Prior to the beginning of the shale oil boom in 2005, 
the Energy Information Administration (2017) estimated 96,408 million cubic feet of natural gas 
worth nearly $836 million was flared or vented2 at extraction sites across the United States; by 
2015, the amount tripled to 289,545 million cubic feet worth over $1,233 million. A large 
amount of that gas has been increasingly flared in Texas, which is the largest producer of oil and 
gas in the United States. As described below (See Figure 2), while prior to the shale oil boom in 
2005, the Texas Railroad Commission estimated 7,743 million cubic feet of natural gas worth 
nearly $57 million was wasted by flaring or venting at extraction sites in Texas; by 2015 the 




                                                 




Figure 2. Estimated Waste from Flaring and Venting in Texas  
 
Source: Willyard, 2019 [Reprinted] 
 
1.3 Importance of this Research 
 
Flaring is problematic, as it wastes energy resources, creates health hazards and 
contributes to climate change. While urban air pollution in the United States has steadily 
declined, flaring has dramatically increased the number of toxic air pollutants in rural areas in 
Texas due to shale gas development.  In 2012, flaring conducted in the Eagle Ford Shale, which 
is just one of Texas’ many oil and gas shale plays, led to over 15,000 tons of pollutants being 
released into the atmosphere, which is more than all high-polluting Texas oil refineries combined 
(Tedesco and Hiller 2014). Flaring releases a large amount of air pollutants into the atmosphere 
including carbon dioxide, methane, and other volatile organic compounds such as benzene, 















































































compounds that produce smog and it is the largest source of methane emissions by the oil and 
gas industry (EPA 2017).  The magnitude of methane emissions from flaring is particularly 
problematic because global climate change is a growing concern. According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2015), over the course of 100 years, methane 
contributes to climate change over 25 times as much as carbon dioxide. In short, there is ample 
research from atmospheric scientists that venting and flaring from the oil and gas industry has a 
negative impact on the surrounding natural environment.  
While natural scientists continue to explore venting and flaring (Howarth, Santoro, and 
Ingraffea 2011. Buzcu-Guven, and Harriss 2012; O’Sullivan and Paltsev 2012; Elvidge, Zhizhin, 
Baugh, Hsu and Ghosh 2015), social scientists have yet to fully explore the phenomenon. The 
primary purpose of this research is to bring social organizations into the analysis of oil and gas 
industry venting and flaring practices. It is critical to include human organizations in climate 
change studies because most methane and carbon emissions are not the result of a natural 
phenomenon; they are the result of the purposeful, incidental, and accidental actions of man-
made organizations. As such, the social organization is the primary unit of analysis. This study 
advances knowledge of how the characteristics of organizations and their interconnected external 
environment relate to extreme pollution by industrial facilities. I take an open systems political 
economy approach to organizational behavior, meaning I conceptualize organizational behavior 
as the result of the historical development of power structures, such as the informal norms and 
formal rules both within the organization and between organizations. I elaborate my theoretical 






1.4 The Pathways to Pollution Framework 
 
There are various institutional processes contributing to climate change. Sociological 
explanations of climate change can be broken down into three lines of research, based on the unit 
of analysis: global, national/local political, and organizational (Grant, Jorgenson, Longhofer 
2018).  
First, world systems analysis research shows that capitalist growth and industrialization 
have led to the establishment of global hierarchies supporting extreme pollution (Bunker 1984; 
Smith 1994; Wallerstein 2011). Partly through the vertical flow of exports from less powerful 
“peripheral” and “semi peripheral” nations to the most geopolitically powerful “core nations,” 
core nations exploit the natural and economic resources of peripheral and semi peripheral 
nations, leading to a larger ecological footprint (Fitzgerald and Auerbach 2016; Hornborg 1998; 
Jorgenson 2006; Jorgenson 2011; Rice 2007). In other words, expansive pollution in modern 
society continues because core nations benefit from environmental exploitation while bearing 
few of the costs. 
Second, from the national/local politics perspective, the advancement of anthropocentric 
climate change is the result of inequality within national political-regulatory systems (Prechel 
2015), and among the political actors involved in environmental decision making (Mohai, Pellow 
and Roberts 2009; Pellow 2000). Facilities controlled by companies in states with stronger 
environmental policies are more likely to adhere to environmental norms and pollute less than 
facilities controlled by companies in states with weaker environmental policies (Prechel and Lui 
2012). Additionally, a lack of inclusive community involvement in land use decisions leads to 




communities (Bullard 1990). In short, when companies dominate local or national political 
processes, they face fewer costs to violating environmental norms. In turn, they pollute more.  
Third, from the organizational perspective, the differences in corporate organizational 
power structures relate to extreme pollution (Grant et al. 2002; Grant, and Jones 2003; Grant and 
Jones 2004; Grant et al. 2010; Prechel 2015; Prechel and Istvan 2016; Prechel and Touché 2013; 
Prechel and Zheng 2012). This research finds large, complex, financially constrained 
organizations pollute the heaviest because they are subject to resource dependence (i.e., the 
degree to which an organization depends on their external environment to survive) and 
organizational inertia (i.e., the extent to which an organization resists change). Organizations 
with more power to resist change have more power to pollute. 
In the process of identifying the global, political, and organizational factors contributing 
to climate change, social scientists have identified several combinations of structural 
determinates of disproportionate pollution by heavy polluting facilities, known as hyper-
polluters. Rather than examining global, national, and organizational variables as competing 
predictors, recent research uses structural “causal recipes”, or different combinations of variables 
that work together, to predict hyper-polluter emissions (Grant, Jorgenson, Longhofer 2018).  
Examining an international sample of the world’s powerplants, research shows those with the 
highest emission rates are (Grant, Jorgenson, Longhofer 2018:65-66):  
“(a) located in the world-system’s core zone and in nations that are disengaged 
from global environmental norms and lack a system of political checks and 
balances (coercive configurations), (b) located in the world-system’s core zone 
and in nations that are disengaged from global environmental norms and owned 




system of political checks and balances and owned by dominant utilities and are 
old (expropriative configurations), or (d) located in the world-systems’ core 
zone and owned by dominant utilities and are old (inertial configurations).” 
In short, the pathways to pollution framework demonstrates that climate change is the result of 
various global, political, and organizational structural configurations. This dissertation expands 
the pathways to pollution framework by examining how the global and political environments in 
which the industrial organization is embedded, and the organizational characteristics of the 
facilities and the companies that directly operate them relate to venting and flaring in Texas. I 
conclude by describing the configurations leading to extreme venting and flaring in Texas and 
developing various policy recommendations to minimize routine venting and flaring. 
 
1.5 Overview of Data and Research Methods 
 
This research involves both primary and secondary source analysis. Primary data sources 
were collected from a variety of resources including industry reports, newspaper articles, law 
reviews, court records and Texas Railroad Commission archival documents obtained through 
Public Information Act requests for documents related to venting and flaring laws and policies. 
Secondary sources were analyzed upon being merged together using a geographic information 
system and unique well, lease, and operator identifiers. Wells are the surface locations for the 
hole in the ground where oil and gas are extracted. Leases are one or more wells on a plot of land 
upon which an operator can legally extract oil and gas according to Texas Railroad Commission 




and responsibility for lease operators according to Texas Railroad Commission records. 
Secondary sources involved various Texas Railroad Commission datasets, the American 
Community Survey, the National Center for Charitable Statistics database, the LexisNexis 
Corporate Affiliations database, and the United States Energy Information Administration 
Intrastate and Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Shapefile. A detailed discussion of the datasets 
used and how they were merged together is in Appendix B and Appendix C.  
 
1.6 Organization of this Thesis 
 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In the next section, I explore the politics of 
venting and flaring by the oil and gas extraction industry in Texas from the 1880s to 2010s. 
Using historical archival documents, I show that while in the late 1940s, anti-flaring policies 
forced companies to invest in the technologies and infrastructures necessary to collect natural gas 
that is otherwise vented or flared, amendments to statewide rules in the 1990s pursued by 
industry leaders created new opportunities for companies to legally vent or flare natural gas. The 
third section examines the communities most exposed to Texas oil and gas extraction industry 
venting and flaring practices. I use cross-sectional geographic datasets to map where most 
venting and flaring occurs and the types of communities most exposed. I find that neighborhood 
economic, political and racial inequalities relate to environmental inequalities produced by the 
oil and gas extraction industry. The fourth section explores the types of facilities and operators 
most responsible for venting and flaring. Using hierarchal cross-sectional data, I show that 
specific coercive, quiescent, expropriative, and inertial structures factors relate to oil and gas 




recommendations to minimize extreme routine venting and flaring practices. Since this thesis is 
organized like a book, detailed theoretical and methodological discussions and details are kept in 




2. THE PROBLEM WITH REGULATION 
 
“We must proactively address flaring with fair, predictable, commonsense 
regulations based on science and fact. If we don’t, we can expect the anti-fossil 
fuel folks, including the EPA, to once again attempt to curtail oil and gas 
production in our state by using politically motivated rulemaking to implement 
their political agenda” (Texas Railroad Commissioner David Porter, 2012). 
Texas state regulators are currently strongly opposed to curtailing oil and gas production 
to force companies to eliminate routine venting and flaring practices. Right now, with the 
support of the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC), the state agency responsible for regulating the 
Texas oil and gas industry, routine flaring is permitted with little administrative cost. However, 
this has not always been the case. In the 1940s, the RRC implemented no-flare bans and curtailed 
or completely shut down production at wells that failed to cease flaring and venting activities. 
Essentially, the RRC went from banning routine flaring and enforcing bans by curtailing 
production in the early twentieth century, to permitting routine flaring throughout the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century. So, what changed? Why and how did the RRC ban 
routine flaring in the past? Under what conditions does the RRC now allow routine flaring? How 
and why is the RRC tackling the problem differently? To answer these questions, we must 






2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons in the Oil and Gas Industry 
 
While Marxists have long argued environmental problems are linked to the unbridled 
self-interest ideology of capitalism, this idea did not become popular in the United States until 
1968 when Harden published his famous article, “Tragedy of the Commons”. Using a metaphor 
of shepherds sharing a common pasture while pursuing their unfettered self-interest, the article 
demonstrates how free-market systems are destined for ecological collapse.  
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding 
one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive 
component. (1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one 
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the 
additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. (2) The negative component 
is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, 
however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the 
negative utility for any decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes 
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his 
herd. And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and 
every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man 
is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a 




pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (Hardin, 1968: 1244). 
The oil and gas industry faces its own tragedy of the commons. Numerous different 
producers with competing interests are each drawing from a shared field with a finite number of 
petrochemicals. Furthermore, as the field goes dry, it becomes costlier for producers to extract 
oil and gas. As such, a rational producer will attempt to extract more oil and gas faster than their 
competition. However, if everyone pursues their rational self-interest, the market would become 
flooded, the extracted resource would lose value, and the field would quickly run dry.  
Due to the tragedy of the commons facing the industry, both industrial and citizen groups 
supported early efforts by the state to conserve oil and gas. These group efforts received common 
support, as the national conservationist movement neared its height. In response to growing 
concerns by the industry and conservationists alike, in 1917 the Texas state legislature 
proclaimed “…The preservation and conservation of all natural resources of the State are each 
and all herby declared public rights and duties and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as 
may be appropriate thereto.” To create instruments to support their proclamation, the Texas 
Legislature passed Senate Bill 68, which provided the RRC with the resources and authority to 
set and enforce regulation limiting wasteful practices in the Texas oil and gas industry. The bill 
gave the RRC the power to: (1) set punishments against those that violate conservation laws 
through fines and jail sentences, (2) control pricing rates for the transportation of crude 






2.2 A Historical Approach to Class Power and Environmental Politics 
 
While I have referred to the oil and gas industry as a group, it is not cohesive. The oil and 
gas industry is made up of numerous factions with competing interests. For example, since it is 
economically infeasible for producers to buy up the mineral rights to all lands where oil and gas 
is extracted, producers rely upon contracts with royalty owners to lease mineral rights. Royalty 
owners are the individuals that own the mineral rights of land and lease those rights to oil and 
gas companies for a portion of the profits. While this transaction requires agreement and 
cooperation, it is also riddled with conflict. It is within both groups’ interest to keep a larger 
share of the profit and it is a zero-sum game. If the producer keeps a larger share of the profit, the 
royalty owner receives less. The industry is riddled with these types of conflicts between 
industry subgroups.  
Political theorists have long debated how industry competition relates to the regulatory 
state (Akard 1992; Block 1980; Evans, Reuschemeyer and, Skocpol 1985; Lenin 1982; Marx 
1867; Polanyi 1944; Poulantzas 1973; Prechel 1991). Much of the debate centers around who has 
political power in the modern social system: the capitalist class or professional bureaucrats. 
Class theorists such as Marx (1867), Lenin (1982), and Poulantzas (1973) claim the state 
functions to support the ruling economic class.  The state provides legitimate coercive power for 
capitalists to better achieve their interests (Lenin 1982). Rules and regulations, such as those that 
established and protected private property, are made to create and reproduce modern class 
relations (Polanyi 1944).  Even though the capitalist class is split, and the state must maintain 
relative autonomy to resolve within-class conflict, the capitalist class can politically dominate by 




On the other hand, state autonomy theorists claim that professional bureaucrats, known as 
state managers, have the power to transcend class structures and control the regulatory state 
(Block 1980; Evans, Reuschemeyer and, Skocpol 1985). The interests of state managers are not 
the same as capitalists. State managers seek to use their knowledge and position to improve their 
status, sometimes using their political power to act in their own interests, regardless of powerful 
industrial actors. As such, the regulatory state cannot be reduced to the interests of the capitalist 
class. Because state managers are more unified and hold bureaucratic power, they can 
independently influence the structure and routines of the regulatory state, despite opposition 
from the capitalist class.  
Historical contingency theory provides nuance to the debate by conceptualizing capitalist 
class power and state autonomy as two extremes on a continuum (Prechel 1991). While under 
some conditions state autonomy theory better explains political outcomes and class theory 
provides less, under other conditions the opposite occurs. From the historical contingency theory 
perspective, the political power of the capitalist class over state managers is related to how 
unified the industry is (i.e., when the industry is unified it can have power over the state), and 
business unity varies over time (Akard 1992). Some of the historical conditions affecting the 
distribution of power include economic downturns, as it provides urgency for organizations to 
create structures that will resolve immediate economic needs (Prechel 1991). Both the state and 
corporations are organizations that require economic resources and legitimacy to survive. When 
historical conditions increase capital dependence and uncertainty (like during economic 
downturns), corporations unify around prevailing public policy to change it in such a way that it 
better suits immediate economic interests. State regulation develops over time and reflects 




control over the industry and during economic crises, the industry unifies to create state 
structures that better serve immediate capitalist interests.  
Likewise, the development of Texas oil and gas conservation regulation is the result of 
historical conflicts where the dominating political group varies over time. In the early 20th 
century, the RRC maintained regulatory dominance over a highly fractured industry. However, 
as the global economy grew, the power of the RRC over the industry decreased. During an 
economic crisis in the late 1980s, the industry exercised its power to push the agency to 
deemphasize conservation and instead create flaring policy to better serve immediate corporate 
economic interests. I describe how changes in venting and flaring regulations relate to the 
historical political economy in the analysis section below.  
 
2.3 Historical Analysis 
 
2.3.1 Texas Oil and Gas Industry Regulatory Origins (1880s) 
 
The oil boom in the early twentieth century transformed Texas, providing significant 
economic growth for the state. Exploration of gas began in 1892 when exploratory drilling was 
conducted on Spindletop Hill. Around this same time, U.S. motor companies began to produce 
automobiles. As the automobile industry began to expand, demand for and the value of crude oil 
increased. The oil industry in Texas exploded in 1901 in Spindletop with the eruption of Lucas 
Gusher. Shortly after, numerous new fields were opened, exploration and production expanded, 
and refineries were built. By the 1930s, Texas produced twice as much oil as any other state 




However, the emerging industry was constrained by anti-trust laws and regulatory 
agencies established from populist triumphs throughout the late 1800s. One key agency 
established from the populist movement was the RRC. Upon campaigning to better regulate 
railroad monopolies, Governor Jim Hogg worked with the state legislature to establish the RRC 
in 1881. By creating the RRC as an appointive agency, Governor Hogg aimed to avoid situations 
where the industry could buy elections. He appointed the first three commissioners: Senator John 
Reagan, Judge W.P. McLean, and L.L. Foster. However, a few years after the agency was 
established, the Texas Constitution was amended to change the agency to be run by three elected 
commissioners. Each commissioner holds a six-year term and there are elections every two 
years. If a commissioner steps down, the governor has the power to appoint a new commissioner 
to serve until the next election. The creating of the RRC as an elected agency rather than 
appointed one had long-term consequences on industry-state relations, especially with big money 
in modern politics. Governor Hogg’s fears have come to life, yet, because the agency now 
functions primarily to regulate oil and gas rather than railroads, it is the oil and gas industry, not 
the railroads, that pour money into elections so that industry candidates dominate. For example, 
the 1976 TRC election of the Jon Newton over populist Jerry Sadler was strongly influenced by 
industry leaders. Over $285,000 came from contributions of $500 and over and 73% of those 
contributions were traced to just a few oil and gas producers (Prindle 1981).  In short, the 
creation of the RRC as an elected agency regulating railroads ended up having long-term 






2.3.2 Political Conflict During the Gusher Age (1900s-1930s) 
 
While regulation is often viewed as bad for capitalists, upon the establishment of the oil 
and gas industry in Texas, capitalists supported regulation to enforce contracts and coordinate a 
fragmented market to prevent over-production. During the first Texas oil boom, the state served 
the function of mediating conflict among capitalists, rather than between capitalists and the 
working communities in which capitalist facilities are located. In an attempt to juggle competing 
capitalist interests, early venting and flaring policies continuously changed.  
In the early days of the industry, the state and industry battled over what is considered 
waste, especially with regards to venting and flaring. At oil and gas wells, companies extract a 
mix of oil, non-associated gas (i.e., raw natural gas), associated gas well gas (i.e., raw natural gas 
mixed with oil and other hydrocarbons at a gas well) and/or casinghead gas (i.e., raw natural gas 
mixed with oil and other hydrocarbons at an oil well). While oil is considered “black gold” 
because of its high economic value, natural gas extracted along with the oil held little value in 
the early marketplace. In attempt to extract the largest amount of oil, fastest, and with the least 
amount of initial expense, rather than purchasing the equipment to collect, store, and transport 
the extracted natural gas, many operators chose to waste the finite natural resource through 
venting or flaring.   
Early venting and flaring policy developed as the state served the function of mitigating 
conflict between competing class segments within the oil and gas industry. For instance, the first 
regulations developed as an attempt to ease conflict between producers and royalty owners (i.e., 
those who own the rights to drill on Texas land). Conflict between these two groups was divided 




mineral rights (i.e., royalty owners) through royalty payments. While operators profit from 
quickly (and not always carefully) drilling, extracting, and collecting the more valuable oil and 
moving on once the well goes dry, royalty owners can only profit from selling the finite number 
of natural resources on their land. In short, natural gas royalty owners saw flaring non-associated 
gas (i.e., the primary commodity of a natural gas well) as unnecessary waste that they could not 
profit from. On the other hand, production companies saw flaring non-associated gas as a 
sometimes-acceptable waste in pursuit of immediate profits. Consequently, royalty owners urged 
state leaders to ban the venting and flaring of non-associated gas at gas wells so that the natural 
resources they owned could be better protected from production company waste through venting 
or flaring. State managers supported the royalty owners because vented or flared gas also 
resulted in lost state revenue. Gas that was vented or flared was not subject to state tax; the 
valuable natural resource is simply released into the air. In short, once released into the 
atmosphere through venting or flaring, the natural resource lost all economic value. For this 
reason, in 1899 Robert Prince of Corsicana led the state legislature to ban the venting and flaring 
of non-associated gas 10 days after the drilling of a gas well is completed (Texas Congress 
1899).  
Competing for profits in the expanding industry, throughout 1918 and 1919, royalty 
owners, federal regulators, gas refineries (who would profit from processing associated gas that 
was currently being flared), and conservationist producers pressured state managers to expand 
flaring policies to better enforce early natural gas and oil conservation regulations by questioning 
the adequacy of state-level environmental governance. For example, the United States Fuel 
Administration named inspectors to investigate the waste of natural gas in Texas (Dallas 




Wichita County Producers and Refiners’ Association announced producers would be working 
with local police departments to enforce conservation laws since state-level enforcement was 
inadequate (Dallas Morning News 1919).  
With legitimacy at risk, the state reacted by enhancing and exercising their authority to 
regulate oil and gas. In 1919, Senator Carlock of Fort Worth introduced Senate Bill 350, which 
gave the RRC the authority to regulate Texas oil and gas production practices (Texas Congress 
1919). This law mandated each company provide the RRC with thorough records of oil and gas 
operation, production, and disposal activities. Furthermore, the bill forced organizations to obtain 
a certificate of compliance to RRC regulation to lawfully operate in the state. This law allowed 
the RRC to regulate oil and gas production and limit production to minimize waste. Since, until 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in the 1960s, 
Texas controlled a major portion of the world’s discovered oil and gas reserves, this law 
empowered the RRC to significantly influence world gas prices (Prindle 1981). In 1931, RRC’s 
first proration order (i.e. a legal order limiting well production) went into effect. Although oil 
and gas production company leaders defied state regulatory efforts, Governor Sterling (1931) 
declared martial law, forcing corporate compliance. 
Despite state efforts to better conserve gas, throughout the 1920s, the oil industry 
successfully resisted the efforts of state managers, royalty owners, pipeline companies, and 
refinery companies to ensure state policy provided legal opportunities to flare gas at oil wells. 
For example, in 1925 after a royalty owner filed suit against an oil production company, the 
resulting legal rulings required producers pay royalties for sold casinghead gas, yet producers are 
not liable for economic losses to royalty owners from wasted gas (Livingston Oil Corp v. 




wells, state managers were met with the difficult task of differentiating between oil and gas wells 
and then only enforcing flaring bans at designated gas wells.  
Despite resistance from state managers, due to oil industry lobbyist efforts, the state 
legislature continued to develop and support state laws which excluded oil wells from flaring 
regulations. For example, in 1931, prominent Texas state officials, including Governor Neff 
(1931) and Railroad Commissioner Parker (1931) testified to the state legislature in support of 
more stringent conservation laws. However, oil producers opposed regulatory efforts; they 
argued that regulating flaring at oil wells would stop the economic boom occurring within the 
state (Dallas Morning News 1931). During this period of time, Texas was highly reliant upon the 
oil industry’s tax revenue. In 1931, the tax revenue directly from the oil industry brought in over 
$82 million, almost 30% of all state revenue (Texas Almanac 1931). Therefore, the newly 
emerging Texas oil industry held significant power over state legislatures, who greatly benefitted 
from the economic growth of the industry. Despite the resistance of state managers, economic 
dependence and oil industry arguments motivated the state legislature to support the oil industry 
over conservationists. Texas legislature passed House Bill 25, which emphasized the RRC’s 
authority to regulate flaring at gas wells, but not oil wells (Texas Congress 1931). 
In sum, during the first oil boom, the oil and gas industry was split into various factions. 
Oil and gas conservation policy regularly changed as competing industrial groups conflicted over 
regulation. The RRC played the role of managing conflict within a resistant industry. This 
conflict resulted in laws that provided the RRC with the power to curtail production to minimize 






2.3.3 The Advancement of Conservationist State Leadership (1930s-1950s) 
 
As the Texas oil boom peaked, capitalists continued to be split over regulation. Since the 
capitalist class was not unified, the state had greater regulatory power over capitalist resistance to 
environmental regulation. With prevailing state policy and without unified political resistance, 
during this period, state managers had the power to force companies to invest in the technologies 
and infrastructures necessary to minimize flaring, which it exercised through scientific and legal 
means. 
Despite oil industry resistance, state managers could expand their authority to regulate 
flaring at wells by supporting the development of scientific knowledge in the newly emerging 
industry and transforming legal context through litigation. For example, the RRC hired chemists 
from the University of Texas to test water-white oil and determine if the substance should 
continue to be classified as oil (Prindle 1981). Upon raising the temperature and pressure, the 
chemists found the white-water oil turned into natural gas. This new scientific discovery resulted 
in hundreds of oil wells being reclassified as gas wells. Since at this point of time, flaring was 
banned at gas wells, but not oil wells, by reclassifying facilities as gas wells, facilities were no 
longer legally allowed to flare gas. As a result, the RRC issued “no flare orders” which forced 
operating companies to shut down well production until the company built adequate 
infrastructure to capture the gas. In 1932 (Henderson v. Railroad Commission), upon being sued 
by an independent producer for shutting down the wells, the RRC argued regardless of the well’s 
classification, flaring is an economic waste and within the RRC’s regulatory jurisdiction. The 




Although the courts held legal precedent for the RRC to enforce polices to minimize 
waste at both oil and gas wells, conflict within the industry resulted in inconsistent state 
legislation. For instance, although policy instituted in 1931 banned flaring gas at gas wells, after 
pressure from gas stripping companies in East Texas, the state legislature passed Senate Bill 92 
(1933). The bill permitted operators to flare gas at gas wells when there is “no reasonable market 
available” (Texas Congress 1933:222). However, the industry did not cohesively support the bill. 
Pipeline companies, who economically benefitted from the state forcing companies to transport 
gas, resisted through an anti-waste lobbying campaign (Prindle 1981). In response, the state 
legislature held hearings from April 9-12, 1934. Land owners, pipeline companies, refineries, 
royalty owners, producers, and other industry representatives attended the hearings regarding 
wasteful flaring practices (Texas Congress 1934).  
In 1935, the RRC teamed up with pipeline companies, land owners, refineries, and 
royalty owners to implement a consistent policy that explicitly banned flaring, regardless if there 
is “no reasonable market available.” With the support of land owners, royalty owners, refineries, 
and gas pipeline companies, in 1935 the Texas Congress overturned Senate Bill 92 by passing 
House Bills 266 and 782. The policies enhanced the RRC’s authority to prevent waste by 
shutting down gas wells that flare gas 10 days after drilling is completed, regardless of economic 
viability. But still, the state legislature avoided conflict with the oil industry by excluding 
discussion regarding flaring at oil wells. When the RRC exercised its power by shutting down 
flaring gas wells, producers responded by filing suit. However, the courts maintained the legality 
of the shutdown orders (Clymore Production Co. et al. v. Thompson et al. 1936).  
After this point, state law regarding oil and gas flaring regulation remained unchanged 




(1) the state legislature explicitly banned flaring gas as gas wells without mention of flaring at oil 
wells, (2) the RRC held the authority to regulate production and waste in the oil and gas industry, 
and (3) state courts provided legal precedent for the RRC to shut down wells that fail to cease 
wasteful practices (such as routine flaring), regardless of the well’s oil or gas classification.  
In the mid- to lat-1940s, anti-waste activists used prevailing state policy to institute a 
strong anti-flaring campaign within the RRC.  The campaign gained steam in 1944 during a 
hearing, when anti-flaring activist and former RRC employee, William Murray, vigorously 
argued RRC official figures on waste were grossly underestimated; tax payers and royalty 
owners only knew of a fraction of the total amount of natural gas wasted from routine flaring 
practices. Forced to respond to his scientifically-informed, public critique, the RRC appointed 
Murray to chair a committee to investigate waste from industry production practices. Once 
completed, the Murray Committee report revealed the large amount of gas wasted through 
flaring (Prindle 1981). 
Although some industry representatives resented the Murray Committee report, the 
industry was not unified in opposition to strong state-level anti-flaring efforts. For example, Dan 
Moran, the president of Conoco, provided public support for the Murray Committee and argued 
that for the sake of the long-term interests of the industry, flaring had to stop (Prindle 1981). 
Public support by some industry leaders legitimized RRC anti-flaring efforts.  
The Murray Committee report increased national concern with the waste of natural gas, 
prompting federal government involvement. In 1946, the Federal Power Commission held 
hearings regarding gas waste in Texas. Out of fear of federal intervention, more oil industry 
leaders began to support strong state-level anti-flaring regulation. Supported by the oil and gas 




control: The Interstate Oil Compact Commission. The Interstate Oil Compact Commission 
directly lobbied for states to support strong, state-level anti-flaring efforts. In response to 
increased pressure from both within the state and across the nation, the Texas Governor 
appointed William Murray to serve in a vacant RRC Commissioner seat, an action supported by 
the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (Morehead 1947).  
Shortly after William Murray was appointed to the vacant RRC Commissioner post, the 
RRC began to implement strong conservationist policies, curtailing production until producers 
ceased wasteful flaring practices. The RRC issued an order to shut down 615 oil wells in South 
Texas until corporations built the infrastructure to prevent flaring casinghead gas (Wells 2014; 
Prindle 1981). Corporations filed suit. The Texas Supreme Court held the RRC could shut down 
flaring oil and gas wells since state legislation authorized the RRC to implement policy to 
minimize waste in the oil and gas industry (Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil 1947).  
In brief, Texas state policy regulating flaring at oil and gas wells emerged before the turn 
of twentieth century. Responding to threats of federal intervention during a period of economic 
growth, the governor appointed a conservationist and anti-flaring activist engineer as a RRC 
Commissioner, William Murray. With the support of key state and industry leaders, Murray 
emerged as a strong conservationist leader who used the power of the state to shut down wells 
until they built the infrastructure necessary to eliminate routine flaring. Because of Murray’s 
efforts, the industry was legally forced to minimize flaring practices by investing in the 
equipment necessary to capture natural gas and either reinject it into an underground reservoir or 






2.3.4 State Responses to Globalization (1960s-1990s) 
 
While prior to globalization, Texas controlled most of the known oil reserves, upon the 
rise of the global marketplace, the RRC is no longer the regulatory powerhouse it once was. As 
the result of busts, increased global competition, and industry cohesion, RRC policy became 
increasingly influenced by capitalists. Thus, during this period, policy shifted to increase the 
legal opportunities for oil and gas companies to flare natural gas.  
In 1960, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established, 
overtaking the RRC’s power in setting gas prices by regulating a major portion of the world’s oil 
production (Prindle 1981). As the oil and gas industry globalized, the RRC no longer held 
regulatory control over most of the known oil and gas reserves. In this way, globalization 
decreased the power of Texas state managers. By the late twentieth century, oil companies 
exercised their power to change RRC policy to allow legitimate routine flaring at oil wells. 
The power of OPEC to influence oil and gas prices created new industry pressures. The 
1970s Middle East crisis resulted in an OPEC oil embargo and gas prices rose (Cross 1970). As 
the nation faced a natural gas shortage, producers were pressured to supply national demand. 
However, Texas oil and gas producers aimed to avoid federal regulation, specifically the 1938 
Natural Gas Act, which gave the federal government authority to set prices and sales for all gas 
transported through interstate pipelines. As a result, although Texas faced an oversupply of gas, 
producers failed to sell the gas to customers across state lines during a period of national 
shortage.  
  The 1970s oil and gas crisis also created new risks for the RRC. The RRC came under 




producers refused to sell gas across state lines to avoid the 1938 Natural Gas Act. To manage 
oversupply, the RRC ordered a prorationing of gas, limiting Texas gas production. This 
regulatory action acquired national attention in 1978, when, on the popular national news 
program “Face the Nation,” Senator Henry Jackson directly accused the RRC of price fixing and 
suggested federal control of Texas gas (Prindle 1981). The RRC and the industry were forced to 
do something in response. 
In response to external political and economic pressures, the oil and gas industry 
politically unified to claim prevailing state regulation established organizational complexities 
which created legal and economic disincentives for the industry to meet national needs.  Industry 
representatives argued that failures to supply natural gas were the result of inflexible and unclear 
regulations impeding the discovery of new gas wells and deterring sales of gas across state lines. 
The federal government conceded to industry arguments and amended the 1938 Natural Gas Act 
to end federal regulation of natural gas prices sold across state lines (Walden 2008). 
Under pressure to better regulate the industry and facilitate growth, the RRC was also 
forced to respond. However, with the industry unified, corporate hegemony (i.e. corporate 
dominance over ways of thought) limited the viable options of state actors. Furthermore, as 
elections started to become more expensive, RRC leaders became increasingly dependent upon 
industry financial support for political elections. Accordingly, the RRC responded by 
regurgitating industry framing of the problem. Statewide Rule 32 was passed, “to provide needed 
flexibility in gas operations,” (Texas Register 1978: 1020). Like previous regulation, Statewide 
Rule 32 banned flaring of gas at gas wells 10 days after drilling is completed. However, the rules 
provided opportunities for bureaucratic exemptions; gas well operators could file a request to 




implementing a permit system and fining gas wells that flared without obtaining a permit. 
However, the RRC did not receive adequate funding to manage their increased administrative 
burdens.  
Throughout the 1980s, oil and gas companies were again under threat from RRC anti-
flaring regulatory actions. Without administrative code regulating flaring casinghead gas at oil 
wells, legal precedent provided state managers with the capacity to restrict the production of 
flaring oil wells. Due to increased flaring activity, RRC engineers recommended operators cease 
wasteful flaring practices (Singletary 1982). Examiners found, despite adequate pipeline 
infrastructure, operators were flaring gas in the Giddens Field area (Singletary 1982). In 
response, regulators issued no flare orders for Giddens Field, limiting the production of wells in 
the area (RRC 1982). In 1986, due to continued waste, the RRC limited the production of oil 
wells throughout the entire state (RRC 1986).  
 The RRC was pressured to initiate strong anti-flaring actions out of fear of loss or dual 
regulatory control by other state and federal agencies. For instance, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), began to pressure the Texas Air Control Board (TACB) to meet federal ozone 
standards. As part of its response, TACB scrutinized emissions from oil and gas flaring practices 
and contacted the RRC (Bradford 1986). The RRC feared external intervention into their affairs 
and took actions to protect its regulatory authority. RRC officials responded by arguing against 
dual regulation by both TACB and RRC; in a letter they state TACB did not need to regulate 
flaring because RRC policy is enough (Hall 1986:2). To maintain their authority and legitimacy 
as the sole regulator of Texas oil and gas well flares, the RRC was again pressured to respond. 




production, the RRC issued shut down orders for flaring gas. Thus, the oil industry faced 
increased threats of the start of a new wave of strong anti-flaring regulatory actions.  
Economic and political threats motivated the oil and gas industry to unify and cohesively 
respond in opposition to strong RRC anti-flaring policy. After increased production in response 
to the oil shortage of the 1970s, an oil glut created economic turmoil for oil and gas production 
companies in the 1980s. Strong anti-flaring state policy threatened corporate profits, as 
companies with few liquid assets preferred to expediently extract oil and burn excess gas, rather 
than invest in the infrastructure and technology necessary to bring extracted natural gas to the 
market. Accordingly, companies mobilized to erode prevailing state policy which allowed the 
RRC to shut down flaring oil wells. 
Economic and legal threats motivated corporations to unify politically to erode flaring 
regulations within the RRC. The RRC responded to industry opposition to strong anti-flaring 
regulatory actions by inviting interested parties to speak at public hearings. During the hearings, 
the industry cohesively argued flaring regulations were too burdensome. Industry officials 
focused on economic expediency and the currently low gas prices (Shook 1985:16):  
Dan H. Montgomery, president of Houston-based Comet Resources, is 
concerned that producers’ inability to sell gas is going to affect oil production. 
Montgomery explained that TXRRC regulations prohibit producers from flaring 
the casinghead gas produced by many oil wells and reinjecting the gas into the 
oil reservoir may not be possible. “Casinghead gas can’t be sold, it can’t be 




two choices: shut in an oil well or give the gas away. They lose money either 
way because they still have to pay the land owners royalties on the production.” 
By employing economic rationality throughout the hearing, industry leaders claimed immediate 
economic interests must supersede RRC anti-waste efforts. Even after the hearings, industry 
officials continued to publicly argue that state anti-flaring regulations threatened state revenues 
(Shook 1988).  
The oil and gas industry used prevailing public policy as a tool to increase legitimate 
opportunities to waste gas through flaring. Industry efforts in opposition to strong anti-flaring 
state policy centered on amending Statewide Rule 32. Following industry recommendations, the 
RRC announced plans to amend policy to include rules for flaring casinghead gas and extend the 
conditions under which flaring is considered necessary. The proposed amendment expanded the 
conditions to include the “unavailability of a pipeline or other marketing facility, or other legal 
uses” (Texas Register 1990a:1680). Upon the passage of the amendment, a permit is approved 
not just for cleaning and repair (like previous policy), but if the producer claims because 
pipelines have not been built, not flaring would result in economic delay.  
In addition to allowing flaring for immediate economic reasons, the proposed 
amendments minimized administrative burdens for routine flaring at low-producing wells. The 
following section was added (Texas Register 1990a: 1680):  
The Director of the Oil and Gas Division, or the director’s delegate, may 
administratively grant exceptions in the manner authorized by subsections 
(a)(2), (b) and (c) of this section. Exceptions granted pursuant to this subsection 




limitation does not apply for volumes of casinghead gas less than or equal to 5 
mcf per well per day. 
This policy change minimized the administrative cost for wells flaring 5 mcf or less of gas each 
day. To put this number in context, in 1990, the average U.S. residential consumer used 95 mcf 
each year (EIA 2010). 
With industry push, RRC state managers again regurgitated oil industry economic 
framing of the problem while overlooking its anti-waste institutional foundation. For example, 
the RRC emphasized the need to minimize administrative burdens and acquiesced to Exxon’s 
request for a higher exemption threshold. Corporate representatives wrote to the RRC 
(Hutchinson 1990:1):  
Exxon Corporation supports the Commission’s proposed changes to Statewide 
Rule 32 with one exception. Exxon recommends that Section (d) be revised to 
allow the Director of the Oil and Gas Division or his delegate to administratively 
approve exceptions to subsections (a) (2), (b), and (c), without a ninety-day 
limitation for volumes of gas less than or equal to 25 Mcf/day. The volume 
limitation in the proposed rule will impose an undue administrative burden on 
both the Railroad Commission and industry.  
As a result, the Commission appointed Mimi Winetroub to review the argument. Legitimizing 
Shell’s argument, Winetroub (1990:1) recommended the changes be approved since it would 




Only 23 leases per month (average) flare/vent volumes greater than 25 MCFD. 
On the other hand, the existing proposed rule with a cut-off of 5 MCFD would 
place a maximum of 80 cases before the Commission each month…. Exxon 
Company U.S.A. filed a comment in agreement with the staff recommendation.  
Following Exxon’s recommendation, the RRC increased the limit from 5 mcf/day to 25 mcf/day 
(Texas Register 1990b). In short, through direct lobbying, Exxon and other oil industry efforts 
increased the opportunities for producers to legally flare gas. 
Statewide Rule 32 amendments minimized the risk and cost of corporate non-compliance. 
Flaring regulations shifted from issuing shut down orders to issuing fees for violating Statewide 
Rule 32. Fines can be issued for up to $10,000 each day the well flares without a permit. 
However, fees are rarely issued (Hiller and Tedesco 2014). Instead, the RRC sends warnings to 
pressure violators to comply to state policy by filing for a flaring permit, which is rarely denied. 
Individual royalty owners and landowners surrounding a property can sue producers for 
negligent waste (Wells 2014), but state structure fails to enforce a strong, comprehensive, anti-
flaring policy. Instead, current state structure provides corporations with the capacity to 
legitimately flare gas, and wells continue to flare gas when economically beneficial (McFarland 
2014).  
In conclusion, globalization decreased the power of state managers over the industry. By 
the 1970s, OPEC began to have greater control over oil and gas prices. Subsequently, economic 
downturns pressured state managers to work with the industry to change conservation policy to 
better meet the immediate economic interests of the industry. State managers employed 




2.3.5 Modern Flaring Politics (2000s-2010s) 
 
The change in policy in the 1990s had major consequences during the shale oil boom. 
With the legal opportunity to do so, many companies have chosen to immediately drill for oil 
and flare natural gas rather than wait to build the pipeline infrastructures necessary to collect gas 
in remote fields where oil and gas had been inaccessible until the development of shale drilling 
technologies, such as fracking. As a result, during the shale oil boom, many communities have 
been plagued by flaring at oil and gas well sites. 
Increased flaring activities during the shale oil boom resulted in increased public concern. 
Although the industry and state support an economic framing of the issue, environmental 
activists and health researchers continue to increase public awareness of the environmental, 
health and economic costs of flaring and venting by the oil and gas industry. Since the 1990s, 
companies continue to develop technology to reduce flaring and venting emissions (Montgomery 
1996). However, many companies fail to invest in new technologies and venting and flaring 
continues to be a major problem facing local communities. As venting and flaring became more 
prevalent during the shale oil boom, communities and corporate shareholders mobilized in 
opposition. Scientists and environmentalist groups released reports about the impact of flaring on 
local community health (Morris 1997). Increased citizen concern prompted private investors to 
call for corporate managers to address the issue (Hayes 2007). Furthermore, oil and gas lawyers 
have called for individuals to sue companies for wasting natural resources and exposing residents 
to pollution by unnecessarily flaring natural gas (Wells 2014).  
While anti-flaring activists have targeted corporations to minimize venting and flaring, 




EPA (Tedesco and Hiller 2014). Due to increased concern with global climate change, in 2011, 
the EPA set new greenhouse gas limits. Although, as a result of industry pressure, EPA policy 
exempted oil and gas wells and pipelines, the regulations still apply to other gas infrastructures, 
such as processing plants. While some companies overcome constraints by investing in new 
portable equipment, industry representatives publicly claim flaring is inevitable because EPA 
regulations prohibit companies from getting quick approval to build the infrastructure necessary 
to capture gas (Landers 2012).  
Aiming to maintain their authority over an industry they are highly dependent upon, state 
managers within the RRC have aligned with corporate managers in opposition to federal 
regulation. In a testimony to Congress, RRC Chairman Barry Smitherman argued in support of 
industry and in opposition to federal environmental regulations (2013): “The key to keeping our 
nation’s natural gas momentum going is to limit interference from EPA.” Because of continued 
cohesive industry opposition to federal environmental regulations and in attempt to maintain 
state authority, the Texas Attorney General sued the EPA (Hiller and Tedesco 2014).  
 Whereas corporate-state relations were more contentious in the early twentieth century, 
the early twenty-first century corporate-state relations are more cooperative. State oil and gas 
regulations have shifted to support cooperative voluntary efforts established in coordination with 
the industry (Dallas Morning News 2013). These cooperative efforts between the state and 
corporations soothe environmentalist concerns without making significant structural changes. 
For example, in 2011, to address the problem of flaring, the RRC initiated the Eagle Ford Shale 
Task Force in coordination with industry officials and headed by RRC Commissioner David 




Robison [chairman of the Permian Basin Petroleum Association (PBPA)] 
praised Porter for taking the initiative on the issue, saying its important flaring 
is addressed within the state by state regulators before federal regulators step in 
and address the issue. Porter, he added, has done a good job of keeping the PBPA 
and other associations in the loop as he studies what can be done and what needs 
to be done to minimize flaring and its impact on the population. 
However, the Task Force did not result in structural changes to limit flaring. Instead, the Task 
Force argued the flaring problem would be reduced if regulations were clearer and permits were 
granted at a faster rate (Vaughan 2013). Because of the Task Force’s findings, the state 
legislature provided the RRC with a $24.7 million supplemental appropriation to digitize oil and 
gas reporting requirements and permit applications (Vaughan 2013). Although these 
administrative efforts speed the process of obtaining a flaring permit, changes do not limit 
routine flaring. Through membership on state-led environmental interest committees, corporate 
interests are achieved while placating environmentalist stakeholders. 
In sum, regulations established in the 1990s created legitimate opportunities to flare gas. 
Many companies seized this opportunity during the shale oil boom. As a result, gas is frequently 
flared at well sites, and the once-banned activity of flaring is now more of an industry norm. 
However, rather than forcing companies to not routinely flare gas from an adversarial standpoint, 
the RRC now works with the industry to enhance and maintain legitimate opportunities for 






2.4 Summary of the Problem with Regulation 
 
Current Texas flaring regulations are problematic because they provide legitimate 
opportunities for companies to routinely flare gas. In other words, there are few political checks 
and balances to corporate power to pollute. All companies can obtain a permit to legally flare 
gas. Furthermore, administrative burdens to routinely flare 25 mcf/day are minimal, as permits 
do not have to be renewed. In short, the RRC provides legitimacy for industry routine flaring 
practices while providing few burdens. Current policies significantly differ from the RRC’s 
strong anti-flaring campaigns in the 1940s.  
Often regulatory organizations shift from their intended purpose due to external 
institutional pressures (Selznick 1948). In this case, oil industry norms for minimal 
administrative costs and prioritization of immediate economic interests became increasingly 
accepted at the RRC, shifting it from its populist and conservationist roots. As globalization 
decreased the regulatory power of the state, the RRC became increasingly reliant on industry 
support. As such, during a period of economic decline when the industry unified in opposition to 
prevailing policy, state managers adopted industry norms and language as they developed 
changes to conservationist policies. These changes led to increased opportunities for companies 
to legally flare gas.   
In conclusion, the power of the environmental state varies over time and does not reliably 
prioritize conservation over the immediate interests of the capitalist class. This is especially true 
in the modern globalized world. Because the state depends on tax income to survive and 
competes with others in the global economy, the neo-liberal global political economy has created 




industry was still booming, the RRC held the power to regulate a large portion of the world’s 
producing oil and gas fields, that is no longer the case. Now the RRC is subject to regulatory 
competition. To entice development in the globally competitive industry during economic busts, 
the RRC shifted its administrative power to prioritize the immediate economic interest of the 
industry by increasing the legal opportunities for operators to vent or flare gas, despite the long-




3. ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITY FROM FLARING AND VENTING 
 
“We went from nice, easy country living to living in a Petri dish. This crap is 
killing me and my family” (Cerny 2014). 
While focus on the harmful environmental effects of shale fracking technologies tends to 
be on issues with water quality from the injection process, poor air quality from venting and 
flaring is also a major concern; fracking well sites vent 30% more methane gas than traditional 
natural gas production facilities (Howarth, Santoro, Ingraffea 2011). Residents in areas most 
affected by the shale oil boom report experiencing respiratory problems from the volatile organic 
compounds like sulfur dioxide, benzene, carbon monoxide, and carbon disulfide from flaring and 
venting at production sites (Morris, Song, and Hasemyer 2014). However, because the Texas 
Railroad Commission permits facilities to legally flare and because most residents do not own 
the mineral rights on or surrounding their land, individuals and communities have few legal 
resources to resist exposure. This section examines how the oil and as industry’s venting and 
flaring affects air quality in affected communities.  
 
3.1 Community Concern with Flaring and Venting 
 
While venting is a near invisible release of natural gas, flaring has an immediate visual 
impact. For example, from space, rural areas surrounding the Eagle Ford shale look like 
metropolitan cities due to the prevalence of gas flares (See Figure 3). The visual impact of 




pollution problem (Prindle 1981). Wells (2014:326) describes life during the first oil boom: 
“According to many accounts, motorists could drive for hours at night in parts of Texas and 
never turn on their automobile lights because the casinghead gas flares illuminated the 
countryside. Newspapers could be read at night by the light of these flares. From the air, West 
Texas was said to look as if campfires of all the armies in the history of the world were burning 
below.” We see this light pollution again today. 
 
Figure 3. Eagle Ford Shale Activity  
 




However, modern concerns move beyond just what humans see, and towards 
understanding the effect on the ecosystem as a whole. Venting and flaring is now understood to 
have both large- and small-scale ecological and health effects.  
Venting and flaring results in large scale ecological effects by contributing to global 
climate change. Venting primarily releases methane gas into the atmosphere. Increased methane 
emissions by the oil and gas industry is of global concern because methane is more efficient at 
trapping heat in the atmosphere. In fact, over 100 years, methane is over 25 times more potent of 
a greenhouse gas than the same amount of carbon dioxide. Flaring also releases greenhouse 
gasses such as methane and carbon dioxide, which significantly contribute to climate change, as 
well as other atmospheric contaminants, including nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, carbon 
monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrocarbons, and hydrogen sulfide.  
The ecological effects of venting and flaring are also small scale. Contaminants released 
during the venting process combined with the heat associated with the burning of natural gas 
during the process of flaring are detrimental to the surrounding ecological environment (Ajugwo 
2013).  Heat from flaring at oil and gas extraction facilities can create ecological dead zones 30 
meters from the facility, negative impacts on vegetation 100 meters from the facilities, and the 
number of species surrounding the facilities are significantly smaller and less diverse (Isichei and 
Sanford 1976).  
Venting and flaring also affects health outcomes, as humans and animals become 
exposed to hazardous air pollutants released throughout the venting and flaring process. For 
example, research shows these practices can cause neurological, reproductive, and 




to flaring pollutants have reported hematological, breathing, and skin problems (Effiong and 
Etowa 2012).  
Overall, exposure to air pollutants from venting and flaring has a negative impact on 
human health and the ecosystem as a whole. However, the immediate health hazards from 
venting and flaring are not equally distributed throughout the population; some groups are more 
exposed than others. So which groups are most likely to experience poor air quality due to 
venting and flaring activities? This is the focus of the rest of this section. 
 
3.2 Environmental Justice Theoretical Debates 
 
Environmental justice is the idea that everyone, regardless of race, income or culture, has 
a right to live in a healthy environment. Environmental justice is considered a solution to two 
main problems in society: environmental racism and environmental inequality (Pellow 2000). 
Environmental racism is a term that suggests communities of color are disproportionately 
affected by environmental risks, whereas environmental inequality is a term that focuses on how 
a wide array of intersecting social hierarchies (e.g., class, race, age, language and disability) 
affects an individual’s access to a healthy environment (Pellow 2000). From the environmental 
justice perspective, environmental sustainability is better achieved through environmental 
justice. Without the ability to target marginalized populations while personally avoiding 
environmental risks, environmental decision makers are more motivated to invest in green 
technologies.  In this way, environmental equity will not only improve the conditions of the most 
vulnerable groups, it will also improve the environmental quality for the general population 




Environmental justice research focuses on how socially vulnerable communities are 
disproportionately affected by industrial pollution (Bullard 1990; Pellow, Weinberg and 
Schnaiberg 2001). There are numerous community characteristics associated with social 
vulnerability and environmental risk (Cutter, Boruf and Shirley 2003). These characteristics 
include economic/poverty status (Wilson, Fraser-Rahim, Williams, Zhang, Rice, Svendsen and 
Abara 2012), education (Wilson et. al. 2012) and race (Bullard 1990; Pais, Crowder and Downey 
2014).  
While environmental justice research commonly focuses on how environmental pollution 
disproportionately affects socially vulnerable populations, there is debate over why socially 
vulnerable groups are exposed. Three key explanations exist: the economic model, the political 
action model, and the pure discrimination model (Hamilton 1995; Saha and Mohai 2005).  
 
3.2.1 An Economic Explanation of Environmental Inequality 
 
Environmental inequality may occur due to rational economic processes. This perspective 
portrays both industrial producers and residential consumers as rational economic actors. It 
suggests that industrial producers weigh the number of people potentially exposed to pollution, 
the potential liability, and the property costs when deciding where to locate high polluting 
facilities. Weighing these costs, in general, they choose to locate high polluting facilities in 
socially vulnerable communities because doing so is generally cost effective (Pastor, Sadd, and 
Hip 2001). Likewise, residential consumers weigh costs and benefits when making residential 
decisions. Due to different economic circumstances, high-income individuals have more 




residents prefer access to a healthy environment, areas with fewer environmental risks are 
associated with higher rent costs and land values, and geographic areas with more toxic hazards 
tend to have lower rent costs and land values (de Palma, Motamedi, Picard, Waddell 2007). On 
the other hand, low income residents face increased economic constraints and are more likely to 
prioritize the cost of rent and transportation access over environmental resources (Hernandez, 
Collins, Grineski 2015). In addition, socially vulnerable groups may have less knowledge of the 
harmful effects of toxic facilities, and thus are less likely to consider these costs when making 
residential decisions (Zhang 2010). Further, when high polluting facilities move into 
neighborhoods, those that prioritize environmental resources over rent costs move out and those 
that prioritize rent costs over environmental resources move in, resulting in neighborhood change 
(Tiebout 1956; Richardson, Shortt and Mitchell 2010). While industrial actors may not intend to 
target socially vulnerable communities, rational economic processes result in disparate 
environmental impacts. From this perspective, economic, political capacity, and cultural 
variables should be significant predictors of exposure, while race should not. 
 
3.2.2 A Political Action Explanation of Environmental Inequality 
 
 Environmental inequality may also occur because socially vulnerable communities have 
lower capacities to politically resist exposure (Mohai and Bryant 1992; Pellow 2000; Pellow, 
Weinberg and Schnaiberg 2001). Whereas “not in my backyard” movements have kept high-
polluting facilities out of middle- and upper-class residential areas, out of perceived job growth, 
heavy polluting organizations are often encouraged by the state and community organizations to 




economic, social and political capital are able to organize and resist heavy polluting 
organizations, communities with less social capital have less organizational and political capacity 
to do so (Pellow 2000). From this perspective, cultural and political capacity variables should be 
the primary significant predictors of exposure. 
 
3.2.3 A Pure Discrimination Explanation of Environmental Inequality 
 
Finally, environmental inequality may be the result of pure discrimination. Research has 
found that minority neighborhoods in comparison to white neighborhoods of similar income, 
experience higher levels of toxic exposure (Downey and Hawkins 2008). The reasoning behind 
this finding is that, due to racism, corporate leaders target minority communities by placing high-
polluting facilities in these neighborhoods, regardless of potential economic and political costs 
(Pulido 2000; Rinquist 2005). From this perspective, race should be a significant predictor of 
residential exposure to toxic emissions, regardless of community class, cultural, and political 
status. 
 
3.2.4 Summary of Environmental Inequality Theoretical Perspectives 
 
 There are three key approaches to explaining why particular communities are 
disproportionately exposed to industrial hazards: the economic explanation, the political action 
explanation and a pure discrimination explanation. The economic model views businesses and 
residents as rational economic actors; the environmental pollution from industrial production is 




focuses on structural power and conflict between businesses and residents; environmental 
pollution is dumped on socially vulnerable communities because they do not have the power to 
resist. The pure discrimination model focuses on how decision-makers will enact their bias and 
choose to dump pollution on minority communities. Depending on the methodological and 
analytical framework, there is empirical support for each of the different theoretical models. As 
such, theoretical and methodological debates are ongoing. For a more detailed description of 
methodological debates, see Appendix A. 
 
3.3 The Communities Most Affected by Texas Oil and Gas Flaring and Venting 
 
This study examines which types of communities were disproportionately exposed to 
Texas oil and gas extraction facility venting and flaring volumes in 2012. As you can see from 
Figure 4, communities in specific areas in the Eagle Ford and Permian Basin are 
disproportionately affected. This research relies on electronically metered venting and flaring 
volumes reported to the Texas Railroad Commission in the monthly production report in 2012 
and demographic estimates from the American Community Survey to determine the relationship 
between the characteristics of communities surrounding facilities to facility venting and flaring 
volumes. My analysis focuses primarily on the characteristics of communities living in areas 
within 1 mile of oil and gas wells producing in Texas in 2012. Communities are defined using 
the Census block group as the unit of analysis. Table 1 provides a description of how variables 
were measured at the community (i.e., block group), and facility level. Table 2 involves 
regression results to determine the relationship between community characteristics and venting 













Facility Level Measure 
 
Community Level Measure 
Dependent Variable 
Venting and Flaring 
Magnitude 
Volume (in mcf) of gas vented or flared at facility Volume (in mcf) of gas vented or flared at facilities within one 
mile 
Economic Inequality Variables 
Income Median ACS income category3  of households in block groups 
within one mile of facility 
Median ACS household income category3 of block group 
Home Value Median ACS home value category3 of households  Median ACS home value category3 of block group 
Portion in Poverty 100 * Households in poverty in block groups within one mile 
of the facility / Households  
100 * Household living at or below the poverty line in block group 
/ Households  
Political and Cultural Inequality Variables 
Portion Uneducated 100 * Individuals 25 and older without a high school diploma 
living in a block group within one mile of the facility / 
Individuals  
100 * Individuals 25 and older without a high school diploma 




100 * Households with limited English fluency in block 
groups within one mile of the facility / Households  
100 * Households with limited English fluency in block group / 
Households  
Population Density Individuals living in block groups within one mile of the 
facility / Land area of block groups within a mile of the 
facility (in square miles) 




Registered nonprofits in the county in which the facility is 
located 
Registered nonprofits in the county in which the block group is 
located 
Racial Inequality Variables 
Portion Black  100 * Non-Hispanic black individuals residing in block 
groups within one mile of the facility / Individuals  
100 * Non-Hispanic black individuals living in block group / 
Individuals  
Portion Hispanic 100 * Hispanic individuals residing in block groups within 
one mile of the facility / Individuals  
100 * Hispanic individuals living in block group / Individuals  
Portion Other 100 * Individuals residing in block groups within one mile of 
the facility that are a race other than black, white or Hispanic / 
Individuals 
100 * Individuals living in block group that are a race other than 
black, white or Hispanic / Individuals 
                                                 




Table 2. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Model Results 
 
 Facility Level Model  Community Level Model 
 b SE  b SE 
Magnitude Model (Predicting Volume)   
Economic Inequality Variables   
    Income -.102*** 0.028  0.101 0.060 
    Home Value -.012 0.016  0.008 0.044 
    Portion in Poverty -.032*** .006  -.042** 0.012 
Political and Cultural Inequality Variables  
    Portion Uneducated -.014** 0.005  0.015 0.016 
    Portion Non-English Speaking -.030*** 0.008  0.040 0.027 
    Population Density -.001 0.001  -1.7x10-4* 7.1x10-5 
    Nonprofit Organizations -1.6x10-4** 5.3x10  -1.6x10-4*** 4.3x10-5 
Racial Inequality Variables  
    Portion Black  0.025** 0.009  0.002 0.011 
    Portion Hispanic 0.028*** 0.004  0.018* 0.009 
    Portion Other 0.031** 0.009  0.058* 0.026 
Constant 9.297*** 0.373  9.211*** 0.818 
Inflation Model (Predicting Zeros)      
Economic Inequality Variables      
    Income -.070*** 0.010  -.098*** 0.026 
    Home Value -.037*** 0.006  0.130*** 0.015 
    Portion in Poverty 0.051*** 0.002  0.012** 0.005 
Political and Cultural Inequality Variables 
    Portion Uneducated -.030*** 0.002  -.013* 0.005 
    Portion Non-English Speaking -.025*** 0.003  -.001 0.006 
    Population Density 0.002*** 3.2x10-4  0.001*** 3.6x10-5 
    Nonprofit Organizations 2.1x10-4*** 3.8x10-5  7.7x10-5*** 1.6x10-5 
Racial Inequality Variables      
    Portion Black  0.018*** 0.003  .017*** .004 
    Portion Hispanic -.021*** 0.001  0.004 0.002 
    Portion Other -.050*** 0.004  0.025** 0.010 
Constant 4.317*** 0.133  0.175 0.316 
Ln Alpha 2.325*** 0.054  2.381*** 0.101 
Alpha 10.228 0.551  10.813 1.088 
N 126,861   15,729  
Adjusted R2 0.030   0.061  
LR Chi2(10) 200.34   102.26  
AIC 1.251   1.368  
AIC*n 158,747.288   21,520.137 







3.3.1 Economic Class and Venting and Flaring Exposure 
 
If a resident owns mineral rights, they receive royalty payments for the oil extracted 
along with the flared natural gas. This “mailbox money” is a financial miracle for these rural 
residents (Tedesco and Hiller 2014). As such, these payments mitigate conflict between residents 
and polluting facility operators, making the community more tolerant of the health hazards being 
produced. Findings show that communities most exposed to venting and flaring experience lower 
levels of economic disenfranchisement.  These findings directly oppose an economic explanation 
hypothesis of environmental inequality. While there is ample evidence that the communities 
exposed to venting and flaring face less economic disenfranchisement in the form of lower levels 
of poverty, the effect on income and household home values is less consistent. 
While facilities located in higher income communities are significantly more likely to 
vent or flare, among producing Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that vented or flared in 
2012, facilities located in higher income communities vent and flare significantly less gas than 
facilities located in lower income communities. Among facilities that vented or flared, if a 
facility were to increase the median income level of households living in block groups within 
one mile of the facility by one category, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the 
facility would decrease by 10% while holding all other variables in the model constant. While 
there is a significant negative relationship between community income and venting and flaring 
volumes, there is a significant positive relationship between surrounding community income and 
the likelihood a facility vented or flared. Among all producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 
2012, if a facility were to increase the surrounding community median household income level 




by 7% while holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically 
significant.  
Among all Texas communities, those with higher incomes are more likely to be located 
near a venting and flaring facility. Among all communities, if the median income level of 
households were to increase by one category, the odds that the community is within one mile of a 
facility that vented or flared in 2012 decreases by a factor of 9% while holding all other variables 
in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. However, there is no 
significant relationship between the characteristics of communities within one mile of a venting 
or flaring well and community exposure to venting and flaring volumes.  
While facilities located in communities with higher home values are significantly more 
likely to vent and flare than those in communities with lower income values, there is no 
significant association between home values and venting and flaring volumes. Among producing 
Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that vented or flared in 2012, when controlling for other 
factors, the higher the surrounding community median owner-occupied housing value level, the 
lower predicted volume of gas vented or flared, but this relationship is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, among all producing Texas oil and gas facilities, if a facility were 
to increase the median owner-occupied housing value level of block groups within one mile by 
one category, the odds that the facility did not vent or flare in 2012 decreases by 4% while 
holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. 
Whereas when examining variation between facilities there is a significant positive 
relationship between home values and venting/flaring likelihoods, when examining variation 
between communities, there is a significant negative relationship. Among all Texas communities, 




odds that the community would be not be within one mile of a facility that vented or flared 
increases by 14% while holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is 
statistically significant. Among all Texas communities within one mile of a facility that vented or 
flared in 2012, when controlling for other factors, the higher the surrounding community owner-
occupied housing value level, the fewer predicted volume of gas vented or flared, but this 
relationship is not statistically significant.  
Results consistently show a negative correlation between poverty levels and venting and 
flaring practices. Facilities located in communities with a lower portion of the community living 
in poverty are both more likely to vent or flare and vent or flare at higher rates than facilities 
located in poorer communities. Among producing Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that 
vented or flared in 2012, when controlling for other factors, the higher the surrounding 
community portion living at or below the poverty line, the smaller predicted volume of gas 
vented or flared, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among facilities that vented or 
flared, if a facility were to increase the portion of households surrounding the facility living at or 
below the poverty line by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the facility would 
decrease 3% while holding all other variables in the model constant. Likewise, there is a 
significant positive relationship between the portion of the surrounding community living in 
poverty and the likelihood a facility vented or flared. Among all producing oil and gas extraction 
facilities in 2012, if a facility were to increase the proportion of surrounding community 
households living at or below the poverty line by 1%, the expected likelihood that the facility did 
not vent or flare in 2012 increases by 5% while holding all other variables in the model constant, 




Furthermore, communities with a higher portion of residents living in poverty are both 
significantly less likely to be within a mile of venting and flaring facilities and experience 
significantly lower volumes. Among communities within one mile of an oil and gas extraction 
facility that vented or flared in 2012, if the proportion of households living at or below the 
poverty line were to increase by one, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at facilities 
within one mile of the block group would decrease by 4% while holding all other variables in the 
model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among all communities, if the 
portion of households living at or below the poverty line were to increase by 1%, the odds that 
the block groups is not within one mile of a facility that vented or flared in 2012 increases by a 
1% while holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically 
significant. 
Depending on the unit of analysis, there are different effects of economic class on 
exposure to venting and flaring practices. Regardless, results allude to economic trade-offs to 
community exposure to venting and flaring. These findings directly contradict economic 
explanations of environmental inequality. Among oil and gas extraction facilities that vent or 
flare, venting and flaring practices are related to lower surrounding community incomes, and a 
lower portion of surrounding residents living at or below the poverty line. Among all oil and gas 
extraction facilities, engagement in venting and flaring is most likely among facilities with 
surrounding communities that have higher incomes, higher home values, and a lower portion of 
households living at or below the poverty line. Among communities within one mile of facilities 
that vent or flare, venting and flaring practices are related to higher household incomes and a 
lower portion of households living at or below the poverty line. Among all communities, 




incomes, lower home values, and a lower portion of households living at or below the poverty 
line. A common thread is that there is a significant negative correlation with community 
exposure to venting and flaring volumes and the portion of surrounding households living at or 
below the poverty. Those who are disproportionately affected by venting and flaring practices of 
the oil and gas extraction industry face lower levels of poverty. This suggests there are economic 
tradeoffs for a community to subject itself to venting and flaring practices.  
 
3.3.2 Political and Cultural Capital and Venting and Flaring Exposure 
 
There is little evidence that communities with less cultural capital are disproportionately 
exposed to venting and flaring. While facilities in less educated communities are more likely to 
vent or flare, venting and flaring volumes for facilities that vented or flared are greater for 
facilities in more educated communities. Among producing Texas oil and gas extraction facilities 
that vented or flared in 2012, when controlling for other factors, the higher the surrounding 
community portion without a high school diploma, the fewer predicted volume of gas vented or 
flared, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among facilities that vented or flared, if a 
facility were to increase the potion of residents 25 and older without a high school diploma in 
block groups within one mile of the facility by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared 
at the facility would decrease by almost 2% while holding all other variables in the model 
constant. Among all producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were to 
increase the portion of surrounding community residents 25 and older without a high school 




by 3% while holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is also 
statistically significant.  
Less educated communities are significantly more likely to be within a mile of a 
venting/flaring facility, yet there is no significant relationship between community education and 
venting/flaring volumes. Among all communities, if the portion of residents 25 and older without 
a high school education were to increase by 1% the odds that the community is not within one 
mile of a facility that vented or flared in 2012 decreases by 1% while holding all other variables 
in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. On the other hand, among 
communities within a mile of a venting/flaring facility, there is no significant relationship 
between community education levels and the volume of gas vented or flared.  
When examining venting and flaring variation at the community level, there is no 
significant relationship between English fluency and venting and flaring practice. However, there 
is a significant, but inconsistent, relationship between English fluency and exposure to venting 
and flaring at the facility-level. Facilities located in communities with greater portion of residents 
with limited English language fluency are more likely to vent or flare, yet venting/flaring 
facilities located in communities with a greater portion of residents with limited English 
language vent and flare significantly less gas. Among facilities that vented or flared, if a facility 
were to increase the potion of households with limited English fluency in communities within 
one mile of the facility by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the facility would 
decrease by 3% while holding all other variables in the model constant. Among all producing oil 
and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were to increase the portion of surrounding 




that the facility did not vent or flare in 2012 decreases by a factor of 3% while holding all other 
variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant.  
In sum, the effect of community cultural capital on disproportionate venting and flaring 
volumes is not clear. Facilities surrounded by communities with less cultural capital are more 
likely to vent or flare, yet among the communities surrounding facilities that do vent or flare, 
facilities surrounded by communities with more cultural capital vent or flare more. While there is 
a significant relationship between cultural capital and exposure when examining variation at the 
facility-level, there is no significant relationship when examining communities.  
Communities with few organizational capacities lack the social resources to resist 
exposure to incoming high polluting industrial facilities. There are fewer risks associated with 
organizing heavy polluting industrial activities in less populated areas and those areas with fewer 
nonprofit organizations that provide residents with greater social organizational capacities to 
legally resist polluting facilities. Results show that communities with less political organizational 
capacities are disproportionately exposed to venting and flaring. 
While surrounding population density is not a significant factor predicting facility 
venting and flaring volumes, there is a significant negative relationship between surrounding 
community population density and whether or not the facility vented or flared- facilities in less 
dense communities are significantly more likely to engage in venting or flaring. Among all 
producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were to increase the surrounding 
community population density by one person per square mile, the expected likelihood that the 
facility did not vent or flare in 2012 increases by 0.2% while holding all other variables in the 
model constant. In other words, facilities surrounded by communities with more people per 




When examining all Texas communities, there is a consistent significant positive 
correlation between venting and flaring and the population density of the community. Among 
communities within one mile of an oil and gas extraction facility that vented or flared in 2012, if 
the people per square mile were to increase by one, the expected volume of gas vented or flared 
at facilities within one mile of the community would decrease by 0.02% while holding all other 
variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among all 
communities, if the people per square mile were to increase by 1%, the odds that the community 
is not within one mile of a facility that vented or flared in 2012 increases by 0.1% while holding 
all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. In short, 
communities with more people per square mile are less likely to be near a venting or flaring 
facility and those that are near a venting and flaring facility experience lower venting and flaring 
volumes.  
There is a significant negative correlation between facility venting and flaring practices 
and the number of nonprofits in the county in which the facility is located. Among producing 
Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that vented or flared in 2012, when controlling for other 
factors, the greater number of registered nonprofits in the county in which the facility is located, 
the fewer predicted volume of gas vented or flared, and this relationship is statistically 
significant. Among facilities that vented or flared, if a facility were to be in a county with one 
more registered nonprofit organization, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the 
facility would decrease by 0.02% while holding all other variables in the model constant. 
Furthermore, among all producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were to 
increase the number of nonprofits in the county in which the facility is located by one, the 




holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. 
In other words, facility venting and flaring practices are more likely and greater in counties with 
fewer registered nonprofit organization.  
Like facility-level findings, community-level findings a significant relationship between 
venting and flaring engagement and volumes and the number of nonprofit organizations 
registered in the county in which the community is located. Among communities within one mile 
of an oil and gas extraction facility that vented or flared in 2012, if the number of registered 
nonprofit organizations in the county were to increase by one, the expected volume of gas vented 
or flared at facilities within one mile of the block group would decrease by 0.02% while holding 
all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among 
all communities, if the number of nonprofits in the county were to increase by one, the odds that 
the block groups is not within one mile of a facility that vented or flared in 2012 increases by 2% 
while holding all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically 
significant. In short, communities in counties with more nonprofit organizations are less likely to 
be near a venting or flaring facility and those that are near a venting and flaring facility 
experience lower venting and flaring volumes.  
Communities and facilities in counties with fewer nonprofit organizations were 
disproportionately exposed to oil and gas extraction facility venting and flaring practices in 2012. 
Additionally, less dense communities experience greater venting and flaring volumes and are 
more likely to be near a facility that vented or flared. On the other hand, while the effect of 
surrounding community population density is a significant predictor of whether the facility 
engages in venting and flaring, it is not a significant predictor of venting and flaring volumes. 




disproportionately exposed to venting and flaring practices. Furthermore, facilities are more 
likely to vent or flare when there are fewer people surrounding the facility. This supports the idea 
that communities with greater organizational capacities are more likely to resist exposure and 
facility operators are more likely to engage in venting and flaring in areas where there are less 
political risks for doing so.  
 
3.3.3 Race and Venting and Flaring Exposure 
 
Particular racial groups are disproportionately exposed to oil and gas extraction facility 
venting and flaring practices. Findings show that Hispanic communities are more affected by 
venting and flaring at Texas oil and gas extraction facilities. 
While facilities that vent or flare are less likely to be surrounded by communities with a 
higher portion of black residents, among venting and flaring facilities, those surrounded by a 
community with a higher portion of black residents vent and flare more gas. Among producing 
Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that vented or flared in 2012, when controlling for other 
factors, the higher the surrounding community portion of black residents, the greater predicted 
volume of gas vented or flared, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among facilities 
that vented or flared, if a facility were to increase the portion of black residents in communities 
within one mile of the facility by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the facility 
would increase by 3% while holding all other variables in the model constant. However, there is 
a significant negative relationship between black communities and the likelihood a facility 
vented or flared. Among all producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were 




likelihood that the facility did not vent or flare in 2012 increases by a factor of 2% while holding 
all other variables in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant.  
On the other hand, while communities with a greater portion of black residents are 
significantly less likely to be near a facility that vented or flared, there is no significant 
relationship between the portion of residents that are black in the community and the venting and 
flaring volume of surrounding facilities. Among all communities, if the portion of black residents 
were to increase by 1%, the odds that the community is not within one mile of a facility that 
vented or flared in 2012 increases by 2% while holding all other variables in the model constant, 
and this relationship is statistically significant. 
Results consistently show Hispanic residents are disproportionately exposed to venting 
and flaring practices. Facilities surrounded by a greater portion of Hispanic residents are both 
significantly more likely to vent or flare and vent or flare a greater amount. Among producing 
Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that vented or flared in 2012, when controlling for other 
factors, the higher the surrounding community portion of Hispanic residents, the greater 
predicted volume of gas vented or flared, and this relationship is statistically significant. Among 
facilities that vented or flared, if a facility were to increase the portion of Hispanic residents in 
surrounding communities by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the facility 
would increase by 3% while holding all other variables in the model constant. Likewise, among 
all producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were to increase the portion of 
Hispanic residents in communities within one mile by 1%, the expected likelihood that the 
facility did not vent or flare in 2012 decreases by 2% while holding all other variables in the 




On the other hand, while communities with a greater portion of Hispanic residents 
experience significantly more venting and flaring volumes, there is no significant relationship 
between the portion of residents that are Hispanic in the community and the likelihood that the 
community is within one mile of the facility that vented or flared. Among neighborhoods within 
one mile of an oil and gas extraction facility that vented or flared in 2012, if the portion of 
Hispanic residents were to increase by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at 
facilities within one mile would increase by 2% while holding all other variables in the model 
constant, and this relationship is statistically significant.  
There is also a significant relationship between the portion of the community that is some 
race other than black, white or Hispanic and venting and flaring volumes. At both the facility 
community level, there is a significant positive relationship between venting and flaring volumes 
and the portion of the community that is some other race. Among facilities that vented or flared, 
if a facility were to increase the portion of residents that are some other race in communities 
within one mile of the facility by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at the facility 
would increase by 3% while holding all other variables in the model constant. Likewise, among 
all producing oil and gas extraction facilities in 2012, if a facility were to increase the portion of 
other race residents in communities within one mile by 1%, the expected likelihood that the 
facility did not vent or flare in 2012 decreases by 5% while holding all other variables in the 
model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant.  
While there is a consistent positive relationship between the portion of the community 
that is some other race and venting and flaring volumes at the facility level, the relationship is 
less consistent at the level of the community. Among neighborhoods within one mile of an oil 




to increase by 1%, the expected volume of gas vented or flared at facilities within one mile 
would increase by 6% while holding all other variables in the model constant, and this 
relationship is statistically significant. On the other hand, among all communities, if the portion 
of other race residents were to increase by 1%, the odds that the community is not within one 
mile of a facility that vented or flared in 2012 increases by 3% while holding all other variables 
in the model constant, and this relationship is statistically significant. 
In sum, due to contradictory findings, there is limited support for the environmental 
racism hypothesis. While communities with a greater portion of Hispanic residents experience 
significantly higher venting and flaring volumes from surrounding facilities, there is no 
significant relationship between the portion of Hispanic residents and the likelihood the 
community is within one mile of a facility. Also, while communities with a greater portion of 
black residents are significantly less likely to be within one mile of a facility that vents or flare, 
there is no significant relationship between the portion of black residents in a community and 
venting and flaring volumes. However, when focusing on facilities, there is more evidence of the 
environmental hypothesis. Facilities surrounded by communities with a greater portion of 
Hispanic residents are both more likely to vent or flare and vent or flare more gas. Furthermore, 
venting and flaring facilities surrounded by communities with a greater portion of black residents 
vent or flare significantly more than communities with a lower portion of black residents.  
 
3.4 An Overview of Environmental Equity Issues 
 
Findings demonstrate that when predicting variation in venting and flaring volumes, 




low poverty and less organized communities are disproportionately exposed to venting and 
flaring volumes, results provide the greatest support for the political action explanation of 
political inequality. 
Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that vent or flare more gas are significantly more 
likely to be surrounded by communities with higher incomes, less poverty, less political power, 
and a higher portion of minority residents. Furthermore, facilities with higher incomes, lower 
housing values, less poverty, less education, less political power, a higher portion of other race 
residents, and a lower portion of black residents are significantly more likely to engage in 
venting or flaring. 
On the other hand, focusing on the community, rather than the facility leads to different 
results. Communities that experience greater venting and flaring volumes are more likely to have 
lower incomes, less poverty, less cultural capital, less political power, and a higher portion of 
Hispanic and other race residents. Also, communities with less economic capital, less cultural 
capital, less political power, a higher portion of black or other race residents are significantly 
more likely to be within one mile of a facility that vented or flare.  
In comparison to economic and pure discrimination explanations of environmental 
inequality, these finding fall more in line with a political action hypothesis; because facility 
operators weigh political costs when deciding whether or not to invest in technologies necessary 
to capture gas that is otherwise vented or flared, the political power of communities surrounding 
oil and gas extraction facility is a key predictor of facility venting and flaring volumes. A 
consistent factor predicting venting and flaring practices is the political power of affected 
communities. Political capital has a significant negative relationship with facility venting and 




In conclusion, it is important to focus on variation between facilities, not just on variation 
between communities, so we can better understand why some facilities are more likely to have 






4. SOCIAL PROCESSES UNDERLYING FLARING AND VENTING 
 
“The ultimate goal is to reduce flaring as much as possible and capture the gas 
in our wells.” (Russel Rankin 2012)  
Venting and flaring extracted natural gas is not usually necessary. There are technical 
solutions available to eliminate routine venting and flaring. Companies sell and rent small-scale 
gas to liquids technologies to bring extracted gas to the market regardless of the location, but 
only some companies choose to minimize venting and flaring by investing in these green 
technologies. For example, to minimize venting and flaring in remote areas in North Dakota, 
Statoil has invested in technologies to store and use natural gas. Many other companies have 
committed to investing in these green technologies to eliminate routine flaring by 2030, 
regardless of facility remoteness (World Bank 2016). However, not all companies are equally 
committed to these green investments. This section explores how variation in the organizational 
and political characteristics of the facility and the company that operates the facility (i.e., 
operators) relate to variations in venting and flaring outcomes. 
 
4.1 The “Double Diversion” Supporting Ecological Inefficiency 
 
Rural sociologists have identified how environmental degradation is supported by a 
"double diversion" (Freudenburg 2006). The first part of the “double diversion” is how 
environmental resources are diverted to privileged groups. There is a prevalent myth that 




However, in reality, a few outliers are responsible for most industrial pollution emissions. In a 
quantitative analysis of industrial pollution from 1854-2010, Heede (2014) found that two-thirds 
of the world’s industrial carbon dioxide and methane emissions came from just 90 large 
companies. Likewise, a small number of facilities and operators are responsible for the Texas oil 
and gas industry’s venting and flaring emissions. In 2012, among the 170,245 producing oil and 
gas extraction facilities directly controlled by 4,425 different operators, only 487 different 
operators (9.91%) engaged in venting and flaring at 7,632 (4.48%) facilities. 
The second part of the “double diversion” is the diversion of narratives such that 
environmental degradation is assumed to be mostly necessary for industrial productivity 
(Freudenburg 2006). Even when controlling for productivity, some types of facilities are 
disproportionately responsible for heavy pollution (Grant et. al. 2002; Grant and Jones 2003; 
Grant and Jones 2004: Grant et. al. 2010). Likewise, venting and flaring practices are not 
necessary for industrial productivity. Even when controlling for productivity, some types of 
facilities and operators are disproportionately responsible for venting and flaring. 
Prior research on disproportionality examines which types of organizations are 
disproportionately responsible for heavy pollution in urban areas. Facilities disproportionately 
responsible for environmental degradation tend to be large (Grant et. al. 2002), subsidiary 
organizations, meaning they are organizations with more than 50% of the stock owned by a 
legally separate corporation (Grant and Jones 2003), and are primarily located in poor, minority 
neighborhoods (Grant et.al. 2004; Grant et.al. 2010, Collins, Munoz and JaJa 2016). 
Furthermore, heavy polluting organizations are affected by resource dependence (Prechel and 
Zheng 2012; Prechel and Touche 2014), corporate structure (Prechel and Istvan 2016; Prechel 




Zheng 2012; Prechel and Touche 2014; Prechel and Istvan 2016). By revealing the types of 
facilities that pollute at a higher rate than others, disproportionality research identifies the 
specific social structural factors related to high industrial pollution levels. However, 
disproportionality research primarily focuses on industrial pollution in urban areas. This analysis 
expands disproportionality research by focusing on a specific form of pollution that occurs in 
rural areas – venting and flaring. In line with research on disproportionality, this section 
identifies the types of facilities and operators most responsible for venting and flaring in Texas.  
 
4.2 Explaining Industrial Pollution Practices as a Two-Part Process 
 
Prior disproportionality research primarily explains variation in pollution magnitude 
among large industrial facilities that reports to the Environmental Protection Agency. As 
explained in detail in Appendix B, research on point emission sources in the United States 
primarily relies upon Environmental Protection Agency data, which omits small organizations 
from reporting.  However, there are a significant number of small organizations within the 
population (Granovetter 1984). By ignoring small facilities and those that pollute little, 
researchers have yet to have a comprehensive understanding of the factors contributing to the 
environmental performance of organizations.  
 The environmental practices of an organization are not just about the magnitude of a 
polluting behavior; it is also about decisions on whether or not to engage in a polluting behavior 
in the first place. Furthermore, the factors contributing to decisions to engage in a polluting 
behavior may differ from the factors relating to pollution magnitudes. For this reason, I examine 




examine the factors related to whether a facility engaged in venting and flaring. Then, among the 
facilities that vented or flared, I examine the factors related to venting and flaring rates. This 
method differs from the analysis in the previous section. Whereas prior analysis assumes the 
processes predicting whether or not a facility vents or flares is the same as the processes 
predicted venting and flaring volumes, this analysis assumes the processes are not similar. This 
allows there to be a sequential decision-making process. One set of factors can influence the 
decision of whether or not a facility engages in venting or flaring. Then, after the decision to vent 
and flare is made, another set of factors can influence venting and flaring volumes.  A detailed 
description of my methodological approach can be found in Appendix C. Facility summary 
statistics are presented in Table 3. Regression results for my cross-sectional analysis are 






Table 3. Measures and Summary Statistics  








1- Facility Vented or Flared, 0- Not 0.036 0.185 1.0 0.0 
Venting/Flaring 
Volume 
Log(MCF of gas vented or flared) 4.97 2.83 4.97 2.87 
Community Variables 
    Income Median Income of Households in Block 
Groups within One Mile of Facility 
56,000 2,060 56,260 1,975 
    Home Value Median Home Value of Homes in Block 
Groups within One Mile of Facility 
102,000 5,187 100,200 5,494 
    Portion in 
Poverty 
Same as described in Table 1 10.43 7.72 11.14 9.45 
    Portion 
Uneducated 
Same as described in Table 1 X X X X 
    Portion Non-
English 
Speaking 





    Population 
Density 
Same as described in Table 1 19,300 2,146 8,564 4,312 
NGOs Same as described in Table 1 344 1,080 168.8 345 
Portion Black Same as described in Table 1 3.89 8.18 1.99 5.24 
Portion 
Hispanic 
Same as described in Table 1 30.48 28.57 43.36 28.46 
Portion Other Same as described in Table 1 1.23 2.53 1.25 2.58 
Facility Variables 
Permit Facility has Permit to Legally Flare 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.30 
Inspections Facility Inspections 1.56 5.45 2.18 9.71 
Oil Produced (Barrels of Oil Produced at Facility)2 2.4x1010 3.1x1011 2.9x1010 1.2x1012 
Gas Produced (MCF of Gas Produced at Facility)2 3.1x1010 3.0x1012 2.0x1011 7.6x1012 
Wellbores Facility Wellbores 2.76 20.87 9.20 76.34 
New Drilling New Wellbores Drilled at Facility 0.06 0.80 0.42 2.05 
Gas Wells 1- Gas Well, 0- Oil Lease 0.69 0.46 0.40 0.49 
Well Density Wellbores within One Mile of Facility 19.72 18.39 15.6 19.3 
Nearest Pipe Miles to Nearest Gas Pipeline 2.42 3.44 2.30 2.97 
Operator Variables 
Oil Produced Barrels of Oil Produced by Operator 1.5x108 2.6x108 1.3 x108 2.1 x108 
Gas Produced MCF of Gas Produced by Operator 6.4x106 1.1x107 9.9 x106 1.2 x107 
Wellbores Wells owned by Operator 3518 4479 5331 6184 
Subsidiary 1- Facility is owned by subsidiary, 0- Not 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 
Ultimate Parent  1- Facility is owned by ultimate parent,  
0- Not 
0.06 0.24 0.18 0.38 
Interaction Variables 
Size Interaction (MCF of Gas Produced by Facility) x  
(MCF of Gas Produced by Operator) 
1.2x1013 5.19 x1013 1.6 x1013 8.1 x1013 





Table 4. Flaring and Venting Hurdle Model Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 VF Fac. VF Vol. VF Fac. VF Vol. VF Fac. VF Vol. VF Fac. VF Vol. 
Community Variables 
    Income 1x10-5*** 3x10-5*** 1x10-5*** 3x10-5*** 7x10-6 6x10-6 6x10-6 8x10-6 
    Home Value 9x10-8** 4x10-6*** 9x10-8 4x10-6 2x10-6 4x10-6* 1x10-6 1x10-6 
    Portion in Poverty -.021*** -.027*** -.021 -.027 -.007 -.017 -.002 -.014 
    Portion Uneducated X X X X X X X X 
    Portion Non-English Speaking 0.022*** -.049*** 0.022 -.049 0.026** -.009 0.034** 0.005 
    Population Density -3x10-9 1x10-7 -3x10-9 1x10-7*** -5x10-9 1x10-7*** -3x10-9 1x10-7 
NGOs -4x10-4*** -.001*** -4x10-4 -.001*** -3x10-4 -.001*** -2x10-4 -4x10-4 
Portion Black -.026*** 0.031*** -.026 0.031 -.027 0.024 -.023 0.27 
Portion Hispanic 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.011 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.13 
Portion Other 0.034*** -.060*** 0.034 -.060 0.039 -.003 0.047 -.008 
Facility Variables 
Permit     1.925*** 1.66*** 1.955*** 1.786*** 
Inspections     -.006 0.003 -.003 0.005 
Oil Produced     -5x10-14 -2x10-13*** -2x10-14 -2x10-12*** 
Gas Produced     4x10-15 1x10-14*** -2x10-15 6x10-15 
Wellbores     0.001 0.002 3x10-4 0.002* 
New Drilling     0.117** 0.204*** .100** 0.147*** 
Gas Wells     -1.24* -2.387*** -1.272* -.195*** 
Well Density     0.003 -.011 -.007 -.010 
Nearest Pipe     -.042** -.124*** -.031* 0.096*** 
Operator Variables 
Oil Produced       -1x10-9 6x10-8*** 
Gas Produced       -7x10-10 -1x10-9 
Wellbores       9x10-5** -1x10-4 
Subsidiary       -.002 1.100* 
Ultimate Parent        0.909 0.054 
Interaction Variables 
Size Interaction       2x10-15 2x10-15** 
Constant -4.784*** 0.879*** -4.784*** 0.879*** -3.863*** 3.831*** -7.067*** 3.584*** 
~N 150,000 5,500 150,000 5,500 150,000 5,500 150,000 5,500 
~Clusters N/A N/A 4,700 400 4,700 400 4,700 400 
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.122 0.042 0.122 0.115 0.390 0.152 0.446 




4.3 The Structural Factors Related to Venting and Flaring 
 
4.3.1. Community Embeddedness 
 
Model 1 shows results of a hurdle regression model using only community 
characteristics, and without accounting for the similarities of facilities controlled by the same 
operating company. These results are similar to facility-level findings presented in the previous 
chapter. For example, the significant predictors of whether a facility vents or flares presented in 
Model 1 are the same as those presented in the previous chapter. However, there are several 
differences. While income has a positive significant relationship between venting and flaring 
volumes in Model 1, the relationship between venting and flaring volumes and income was 
negative in the previous chapter. Also, while the portion of the surrounding community that is 
some race other than black, Hispanic, or white has a significant negative relationship with 
venting and flaring volumes in Model 1, the relationship between venting and flaring volumes 
and the portion of the surrounding community that is some other race was positive in the 
previous chapter. These differences emerge for two reasons. First of all, Model 1 explains 
venting and flaring as a two-part process. Second, Model 1 involved the use of restricted Census 
data to better quantify the characteristics of remote communities. Findings from Model 1 provide 
further support for the theory that there are economic tradeoffs for a community to subject itself 
to venting and flaring practices. Because facilities that vent and flare more are associated with 
higher incomes, higher home values, and lower poverty levels, surrounding residents may be 




Model 2 is like Model 1, but Model 2 accounts for the similarities of facilities controlled 
by the same operating company. Results show that once these similarities are accounted for, few 
community characteristics are significant predictors of venting and flaring practices. For 
example, the only significant predictor of whether or not a facility engages in venting and flaring 
is the household income of surrounding communities; facilities in areas where residents have 
higher incomes are more likely to vent or flare than facilities in areas with lower incomes. There 
are several significant community predictors of facility venting and flaring volumes. Results 
show communities with higher incomes, higher population densities and fewer registered 
nonprofit organizations have significantly higher venting and flaring volumes. However, as 
demonstrated by Pseudo R2s of less than 0.15, Model 2 accounts for a small amount of variation 
in venting and flaring practices.  
Like Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 both account for similarities of facilities controlled 
by the same operating company. However, Model 3 controls for facility-level predictors and 
Model 4 controls for both facility and operator-level predictors. As demonstrated by Pseudo R2s 
ranging from 0.390 to 0.446, these model account for a much larger variation in venting and 
flaring volumes than Model 2. Results show that once both facility and operator characteristics 
are accounted for, there is no relationship between community characteristics and venting and 
flaring volumes. Furthermore, the only significant predictor of whether or not a facility vents or 
flares is the potion of non-English speakers surrounding the facility. For each percent increase in 
the portion of residents surrounding the facility that speak little to no English, the estimated odds 
that the facility vented or flared increases by 3%, regardless of other facility and operator factors, 




In short, when controlling for facility and operator-level factors, community 
embeddedness has a significant effect on facility participation in venting and flaring practices, 
but it does not influence the extent to which the facility vents or flares. Facilities surrounded by 
communities with a higher portion of non-English speaking residents are more likely to vent and 
flare than facilities surrounded by communities with a lower portion of non-English speaking 
residents. This suggests the cultural capital of communities surrounding a facility is associated 
with whether or not the surrounding community is exposed to venting and flaring, but not the 
extent to which the community is exposed. 
 
4.3.2. Regulatory Embeddedness 
 
Results show that regulatory embeddedness is a factor associated with facility venting 
and flaring practices. Permitting is associated with both facility participation in venting and 
flaring practices and the extent to which the facility vents or flares, but state inspections is not. 
State permitting of venting and flaring is related to the venting and flaring practices of facilities, 
even when controlling for other community, operator, and facility-level factors. As shown in 
Model 4, the estimated odds that a facility that received a permit to legally vent or flare vents or 
flares is 7 times greater than the corresponding odds for a facility that did not receive a permit, 
regardless of other facility, community and operator factors and this relationship is statistically 
significant. Similarly, among venting and flaring facilities, the venting and flaring volumes of 
facilities that received a permit to legally vent or flare are about 6 times greater than the 
corresponding venting and flaring volumes of facilities that did not receive a permit to legally 




venting and flaring practices. By providing companies with legal opportunities to vent or flare, 
state permits allow for extreme venting and flaring. However, inspections do little to deter 
venting and flaring. In line with arguments made in section 2, this suggests that state policy 




Size has a significant, but inconsistent, effect on venting and flaring. As shown in Model 
4, while there is no direct relationship between the volume of gas produced and facility venting 
and flaring practices, there is an inconsistent significant effect between the volume of oil 
produced by facilities and operators. Facilities that produce more oil are less likely to vent or 
flare and they vent and flare less extensively than those that produce less oil. However, operators 
that produce more oil vent and flare more extensively than those that produce less oil.  This 
suggests that the effect of organizational inertia on environmental degradation emerges at the 
operator-level. Because large oil production companies are likely to have more employees, more 
hierarchical layers, and more political and economic power, they are less responsive to changes 
in technology. However, further research using restricted business data is needed to further 
explore the relationship between size and venting and flaring practices.  
While there is no main effect of facility and operator gas production on venting and 
flaring volumes, there is a significant interaction effect. High gas production facilities operated 
by companies that produce more gas vent and flare more than smaller gas production facilities 
operated by companies that produce less gas. This contradicts my original hypothesis that large 




facilities. Future research should further explore why small gas production companies vent and 




While more complex facilities are related to more extensive venting and flaring, there is 
no relationship between facility complexity and whether or not the facility engages in the 
practice.  According to Model 4, facilities with more drilled wellbores have no significant 
relationship with whether or not the facility vents or flares, but there is a significant positive 
relationship between facility wellbores and venting and flaring volumes. For every additional 
wellbore drilled at the facility, the expected amount of gas vented or flares increases by 0.2%, 
regardless of other facility, community and operator factors and this relationship is statistically 
significant. This suggests that because there are more wellbores where venting and flaring could 
occur, facilities with more wellbores vent and flare more gas than facilities with fewer wellbores.  
However, at the operator-level, operators with more complex operations are more likely 
to engage in venting and flaring, but there is no relationship between operator complexity and 
venting and flaring volumes. According to Model 4, for every additional wellbore drilled by the 
operator, the expected odds a facility vents or flares increases by 0.009%, regardless of other 
facility, community and operator factors and this relationship is statistically significant. This 
suggests that, because operators with more wellbores drilled have more complex operations, they 






4.3.5. Economic Costs 
 
Various economic costs come to play when operators decide whether or not to flare and 
to what extent. (1) Because there are few incentives for the company to build pipeline and invest 
in technology until after a well has been drilled and the productivity and potential of the well has 
been established, facilities with newly established wellbores are expected to vent and flare more. 
(2) Since the primary purpose of natural gas extraction facilities is to extract natural gas, no oil, it 
is expected that, in comparison to oil facilities, natural gas extraction facilities have a negative 
association with venting and flaring. (3) Because there are greater opportunities to pool group 
resources to build pipeline infrastructures in densely developed areas, dense oil and gas 
extraction development areas are expected to be negatively correlated with venting and flaring 
practices. (4) Since it is costlier to establish infrastructure and pipeline in areas that are far from 
already established pipeline, it is expected that the distance between the facility and established 
pipeline infrastructures is positively associated with venting and flaring practices.  
As expected, facilities with newly drilled wells are more likely to vent or flare, and they 
vent and flare more gas than facilities where new drilling did not occur. According to Model 4, 
the estimated odds that a facility with newly drilled wells vents or flares is 10.5% greater than 
the corresponding odds for a facility that did not drill new wells, regardless of other facility, 
community, and operator factors and this relationship is statistically significant. Additionally, for 
facilities where new drilling occurred, the predicted venting and flaring volume would be 16% 
higher than for facilities where new drilling did not occur. This suggests that because it is more 
economical to flare the first few days upon completion rather than invest in green technologies, 




Also as expected, facilities that are classified as gas extraction facilities are less likely to 
vent or flare and they vent and flare less than facilities classified as oil extraction facilities. 
According to Model 4, the estimated odds that a gas well vents or flares is 72% lower than the 
corresponding odds for an oil extraction facility and this relationship is statistically significant. 
Also, for gas extraction facilities, the predicted venting and flaring volume would be 18% lower 
than for oil extraction facilities, regardless of other facility, operator and community 
characteristics. This suggests that, because the primary purpose of gas wells is to collect 
extracted natural gas, gas extraction facilities are less likely to vent and flare than oil extraction 
facilities.  
The density of oil and gas extraction facility development has no significant relationship 
between venting and flaring practices, but there is an inconsistent significant relationship 
between distance to nearest pipeline and venting and flaring practices. Operators claim venting 
and flaring practices are primarily due to lack of available pipeline and the cost and time it takes 
to build pipeline in undeveloped areas. However, facilities nearer to established natural gas 
pipeline are significantly more likely to vent or flare than those further away. According to 
Model 4, for each mile increase in distance between the facility location and nearest established 
natural gas pipeline, the estimated odds that the facility vented or flared decreases by 3%, 
regardless of other facility and operator factors, and this relationship is statistically significant. 
However, as expected, there is a significant positive relationship between the distance to the 
nearest pipeline and facility venting and flaring volumes. For each mile increase in distance 
between the facility location and nearest established natural gas pipeline, the predicted venting 
and flaring volume would increase by 10%, regardless of other facility, community, and operator 




incentives to build natural gas pipeline or invest in green completion equipment, an operator will 
choose to vent or flare, even though established pipeline is nearby. Also, because it is costlier to 
build natural gas pipeline when established pipeline is further away, an operator will vent and 
flare more gas at facilities where established pipeline is not nearby.  
 
4.3.6. Organizational Structure 
 
Natural gas is extracted using a drilling rig on top of one or more wells4 within a lease5 
controlled by an operating company whose headquarters is typically at a separate physical 
                                                 
4 A well is a surface area drilled for the purpose of extracting petroleum crude oil and/or natural 
gas. The difference between a gas well and an oil well is the amount of raw gas that is produced 
in comparison to crude oil. Texas Natural Resources Code Sec 86.002 sets the ratio at 100,000 or 
more cubic feet of natural gas per every barrel of crude oil (Wilson 1977). 
5 A lease is a legal a deed which authorizes exploration and production of minerals for a specific 
tract of land, which is made up of one or more Census block groups. Texas gas leases consist of 
only one active well, whereas Texas oil leases consist of one or more active wells.  According to 
Texas Railroad Commission records (See Appendix C for more details on how this information 
was obtained), in 2012, the median oil lease was 1 well. However, on average, leases consist of 
4.36 wells with a standard deviation of 21.7. The number of active wells on oil leases ranged 
from 1 to 1765. In 2012, on average, Texas oil leases make up 1.1 Census block groups with a 




location than the producing facility. Using business language, the natural gas production industry 
is organized as a set of branch plants6 (i.e. extraction facilities, which are drilling rigs within a 
lease of land) controlled by central headquarters7 (i.e. the operating company). Operating 
companies and extraction facilities can exist within a more complex organizational network (See 
Figure 5). When structured as a multilayer subsidiary organization, an operating company can be 
either a subsidiary or an ultimate parent company. A subsidiary, which can also be a parent 
company of another subsidiary, is a legally independent corporation with more than 50% of its 
stock owned by another company. The ultimate parent company is the top company within a 
corporate hierarchy, which owns one or more subsidiaries.  
Prior research finds that because there is a legal buffer between subsidiary companies and 
ultimate parents, subsidiaries are more prone to pollution (Grant and Jones 2003; Prechel and 
Istvan 2016; Prechel and Touche 2014; Prechel and Zheng 2012). Findings further support this 
line of research; subsidiaries vent and flare significantly more gas than non-subsidiary 
organizations. According to Model 4, among venting and flaring facilities, the venting and 
flaring volumes of facilities that are operated by subsidiary organizations are about 3 times 
greater than facilities controlled by operators not organized using a multilayer subsidiary form. 
This suggests that because there is a liability firewall protecting ultimate parent companies from 
                                                 
6 According to Dun & Bradstreet (2015): “A branch is a secondary location of a business. It has 
no legal responsibility for its debts, even though bills may be paid from the branch location.”  
7 According to Dun & Bradstreet (2015): “A headquarters is a business location that has 




negative repercussions from extreme venting and flaring, subsidiaries vent and flare more than 
non-subsidiary organizations. 
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4.4 How Social Organization Matters 
 
In conclusion, organizational structures and the political and economic structures 
surrounding the organization effect venting and flaring. Findings show that the structure of the 
organization matters when explaining extreme venting and flaring. I find subsidiary companies 
vent and flare significantly more than other corporate types. These findings suggest because 
there is a liability firewall preventing companies from being directly responsible for extreme 
pollution, subsidiaries pollute more than non-subsidiary organizations. I also find that large oil 
production companies and facilities with more wellbores vent and flare more gas. These findings 
suggest that, because organizational inertia prevents large companies and more complex facilities 
from changing, larger, more complex organizations pollute more than smaller, less complex 
organizations. Findings also show that the economic structure in which oil and gas companies 
are embedded also effect industry venting and flaring practices. Results indicate facilities that 
vent and flare more gas are further from oil and gas pipelines, are oil leases, and have new 
drilling. This suggests that extreme venting and flaring is related to the immediate economic 
costs involved in building infrastructure and investing in green completion equipment and there 
are immediate economic gains from collecting petroleum and flaring the gas at oil sites. In 
addition, findings show that the political structure in which oil and gas companies are embedded 
affect industry venting and flaring practices. I find that venting and flaring practices have a 
positive correlation with state permitting. Extreme pollution is more likely when state regulation 
provides companies with legal opportunities to engage in extreme pollution practices.  




5. CONCLUSION- A PLAN FOR CHANGE 
 
“The only way to get the whole industry working on the problem is to craft new 
regulations and enforce them” (Gunning 2014). 
Legal, economic, and political frameworks support routine venting and flaring in Texas. 
By creating legal opportunities to unnecessarily vent and flare, state law and administrative code 
legitimates unnecessary venting and flaring. Since immediate financial incentives often outweigh 
the immediate economic costs of venting and flaring, prevailing economic structures encourage 
unnecessary venting and flaring. Furthermore, industry influence over TXRRC election and 
policy outcomes prevents the state from enacting strict anti-flaring regulation.  Since prevailing 
legal, economic, and political structures support venting and flaring practices, in order to 
transform venting and flaring practices, political, legal, and economic structures must change. In 
this section, I discuss the need for change and lay out five recommendations. I conclude by 
summarizing the pathways to venting and flaring described in this thesis and how the 
recommended changes will eliminate current pathways.  
 
5.1 The Need for Change 
 
Although prevailing structures create incentives for individual operators to vent and flare, 
venting and flaring practices continue to produce immediate environmental harms for wider 
society and long-term economic harms for the individual operator. For economic, environmental, 




Venting and flaring is an economic waste for the state. Venting and flaring practices continue to 
expand, even as there is a bust. While prior to the shale oil boom in 2005, 7,743 million cubic 
feet of natural gas worth over $67 million was wasted by flaring or venting at extraction sites in 
Texas. In 2012, the amount grew over six fold to 48,192 million cubic feet worth nearly $228 
million.  The amount continues to expand. This waste of a finite natural resource results in 
immediate economic losses for the state and mineral rights owners.  
Venting and flaring also contributes to global climate change. Flaring and venting 
releases a large amount of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere including carbon dioxide and 
methane gas. In fact, flaring and venting is the largest source of methane emissions by the oil and 
gas industry (EPA 2017). This is particularly problematic because over the course of 100 years, 
methane contributes to climate change over 25 times as much as carbon dioxide (EPA 2015). 
Global climate change threatens our planet by changing global temperatures, leading to extreme 
weather patterns and rising sea levels. Since current venting and flaring practices by the oil and 
gas extraction industry is a major source contributing to climate change, it is important to change 
prevailing venting and flaring practices.   
Finally, venting and flaring is problematic because it produces environmental injustices. 
In 2012, flaring conducted in the Eagle Ford Shale, which is just one of Texas’ many oil and gas 
shale plays, led to over 15,000 tons of pollutants being released into the atmosphere, which is 
more than high-polluting Texas oil refineries (Tedesco and Hiller 2014). Flaring is the largest 
industrial source of smog, which exposes surrounding populations to potential negative health 
effects, such as asthma. Furthermore, as this research shows, the hazards of venting and flaring 
disproportionately rest on Hispanic populations. As such, it is a producer of environmental 




In sum, regardless if you prioritize economic productivity or environmental and social 
justice, venting and flaring by the oil and gas industry is a problem. Additionally, venting and 
flaring is not a problem that is going away. Even as shale oil and gas development slow, venting 
and flaring practices continue to expand.  As such, there is a growing need to change social 
structures to eliminate unnecessary routine venting and flaring practices.  
 
5.2 Five Recommendations for Change 
 
5.2.1 Strengthening Regulatory Frameworks 
 
 As described in Section 2, amendments to Statewide Rule 32 created legal opportunities 
for companies to waste gas that could otherwise be sold for a profit. In order to ensure companies 
do not continue wasteful practices, TXRRC must eliminate legal loopholes. Therefore, I 
recommend the advice of legal scholar and professor Brett Wells, JD (2014:355), that “statewide 
Rule 32 be amended to allow the flaring of natural gas only after the operator establishes that a 
no-flare policy would itself result in physical waste or would represent a potential loss of one’s 
opportunity to obtain a fair share of the oil and gas in place.” This would ensure RRC policy 
prioritizes its original purpose to minimize waste while still ensuring companies are able to fairly 






5.2.2 Campaign Finance Reform 
 
 Prior to its establishment as an oil and gas regulatory agency, RRC was changed to be run 
by three elected officials rather than appointed ones. With big financial interests, RRC elections 
have become dominated by the oil and gas industry. In order to keep industry money from 
dominating local politics, Texas state legislature must enact campaign finance reform laws. First 
of all, state laws should limit the time and amount of financial contributions that can be received 
by those running for office. By creating a lower threshold for the length and financial resources 
of a campaign, unfair industry influence on RRC election actions can be minimized. Also, to 
ensure RRC commissioners do not use their power to ensure industry support for a re-election 
campaign, RRC commissioners should only be allowed to serve one term in office. By shifting 
power away from industry selected RRC candidates and toward RRC state managers (while 
keeping industry power over state managers in check by the continued enforcement of Texas 
revolving door provisions), industry dominance of RRC outcomes can be minimized.   
 
5.2.3 Strengthening Fiscal Frameworks 
 
 As described in section 2, since companies face few, if any, economic repercussions for 
venting and flaring, there are few financial incentives for companies to eliminate flaring. Since 
corporate boards are often judged by quarterly profit reports, financial incentives and penalties 
drive corporate behavior. This is especially true regarding venting and flaring.  As shown in the 
previous section, extreme pollution is associated with economic costs such as the development of 




the primary commodity of gas extraction facilities, in comparison to oil extraction facilities, gas 
extraction facilities vent and flare at a much lower rate. Also, since there are immediate 
economic costs with purchasing green completion equipment, facilities with new drilling vent 
and flare more gas than those without new drilling. Furthermore, because there are more costs 
associated with building pipeline infrastructure in remote locations, there is a significant positive 
correlation between the distance to the nearest pipeline and extreme venting and flaring.  
State created fiscal frameworks can be used to eliminate routine venting and flaring 
(World Bank 2009). Fiscal frameworks must enhance the financial penalties for venting and 
flaring and enhance the incentives to utilize gas that is otherwise being vented or flared using a 
two-pronged penalty and incentive approach. A penalty approach should be taken by the Texas 
legislature to provide the RRC with the resources and mission to routinely identify and heavily 
fine venting and flaring facilities. The financial incentives approach should be taken by the RRC 
by reducing taxes on facilities that invest in the development, purchase, or rental of gas 
utilization equipment. This two-pronged approach must shift conditions such that the financial 
incentives to utilize extracted natural gas will outweigh the financial costs. Since money matters 
to corporations, shifting the financial conditions involved in decisions to vent and flare will 
change venting and flaring outcomes.  
 
5.2.4 Using Litigation to Force Compliance 
 
 There are several avenues for mineral rights owners, surface rights owners, and adjacent 
landowners to use private litigation to force companies to eliminate wasteful venting and flaring 




can use legal president that the mineral rights owner is entitled to receive maximum gross 
royalties (Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool), and the fact that flaring reduces gross 
royalties. Second, surface rights owners can sue venting and flaring operators by using tort law 
to claim that venting and flaring is a nuisance that affects air quality. By enacting the legal 
advice laid out in the Texas Journal of Oil Gas and Energy Law (Wells 2014), mineral rights 
owners, surface rights owners, and adjacent landowners can use private litigation to legally force 
companies to eliminate venting and flaring. Based on historical evidence described in Section 2, 
litigation is a critical component in forcing companies to eliminate unnecessary venting and 
flaring practices.  
 
5.2.5 Increasing Public Access to Information 
 
 Prior to this research, point-level maps of venting and flaring volumes were not publicly 
available. To create these maps, in addition to using GIS resources made available through a 
National Science Foundation Grant and affiliation with Texas A&M University, RRC required 
several thousand dollars of payments. While Texas law allows state agencies to have the option 
to waive fee requirements if the information will primarily benefit the public, even though it was 
not disputed that by producing mobile-friendly GIS maps of the data, the research will primarily 
benefit the public, Public Information Act fee waivers were denied. In addition to the large 
economic cost to access comprehensive information about lease venting and flaring estimates, a 
large amount of technical skill and time was required to examine the places most affected by 
venting and flaring. As described in the Appendix, to find the places where venting and flaring 




information provided was incomplete. In order to make information more accessible to the 
public, the Texas Railroad Commission should be required waive all Public Information Act fee 
requests for academic researchers and to make editable online maps of monthly and yearly 




This thesis explored the social structures that support extreme pollution from venting and 
flaring. These structures are described as coercive, quiescent, expropriative and inertial. Coercive 
structures involve those that provide minimal local resistance to extreme pollution through hard 
power. I find the coercive power of the state has a major effect on venting and flaring practices. 
Quiescent structures involve those that provide minimal local resistance to extreme pollution 
through soft power. The quiescent power of operators, like the positive economic effects on 
surrounding communities and the influence of large oil companies such as Exxon in informing 
Texas oil and gas industry venting and flaring regulations, affects the venting and flaring 
practices of organizations. Expropriative structures, which involve the weighing of economic 
costs and incentives, are also major factors. Finally, I find inertial structures, like the size and 
complexity of organizations, are related to extreme pollution. However, due to a lack of 
comprehensive public data, inertial structures such as ultimate parent company size and age were 
not examined. Future research should examine these configurating using restricted business data 
available in a Federal Statistical Research Data Center. 
In order to change venting and flaring practices, we must change these coercive, 




strengthening regulatory frameworks, enacting campaign finance reform, strengthening fiscal 
frameworks, using private litigation to force compliance, and increasing public access to 
information. By closing loop holes that allow unnecessary venting and flaring, by providing 
accessible information to affected communities, and by encouraging the pursuit of private 
litigation in cases where companies unnecessarily vent and flare, coercive structures can be 
strengthened to eliminate unnecessary venting and flaring. Quiescent structures, like the 
influential soft power of money in campaign finance, can also be enhanced to decrease the power 
of hyper-polluters. Finally, the expropriative structures contributing to flaring can be improved 
by changing fiscal frameworks such that the costs of venting and flaring outweigh the financial 
incentives to fail to invest in the technology, equipment, and infrastructure necessary to eliminate 
routine venting and flaring. While venting and flaring is a growing concern, venting and flaring 
practices are not normal or inherent; they are the result of socially constructed political, legal, 
and economic arrangements. By changing these man-made social structures, venting and flaring 
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As the environmental justice movement grew in impact, so did debate over how to best 
assess and quantify environmental inequality. Environmental inequality research traditionally 
focuses on the communities disproportionately exposed to the environmental harms of capitalist 
production (Bullard 1990). However, a new line of research focuses on the facilities 
disproportionately responsible for toxic emissions and the communities surrounding facility 
locations (Grant, Trautner, Downey, and Thiebaud 2010).  In sum, there is a methodological 
debate regarding quantitative environmental justice analysis. Much of the debate centers on 
determining emission sources, measuring proximity to environmental risks and defining the unit 
of analysis (Liu 2001).  
In this appendix, I argue that “bringing the polluters back in” to environmental inequality 
analysis (Grant et al. 2010) is critical to understand how environmental inequality is produced. 
There are both broad and narrow purposes for this appendix. The broad goal is to discuss 
methodological debates among quantitative environmental justice scholars.  The narrower 
purpose is to make an argument for the methodological approach to environmental inequality 
used throughout this monograph.  
 
A.1 Determining Emission Point Sources 
 
Environmental inequality research traditionally involves point source pollution. Point 
source pollution is pollution that can be attributed to a primary point source, such as an industrial 




Protection Agency Toxic Release Inventory (EPA TRI) and the Environmental Protection 
Agency Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (EPA GHGRP). However, there are limitations 
associated with using these data sources, particularly as it pertains to the oil and gas extraction 
industry. 
 
A.1.1 Environmental Protection Agency Toxic Release Inventory (EPA TRI) 
 
The EPA TRI was created by under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act signed into law on October 17, 1986 by President Reagan. To assist preparedness for 
chemical spills, the EPA TRI provides communities with information on chemicals used at some 
industrial production facilities.  Facilities must meet three criteria to be required to report to the 
EPA TRI: (1) it must be within a specific industrial sector, (2) it must employ 10 or more full-
time employees, and (3) it must handle 25,000 pounds of chemicals or more within the year. The 
oil and gas extraction industry is exempt from reporting.  
 
A.1.2 Environmental Protection Agency Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (EPA GHGRP) 
 
Responding to the passage of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the EPA 
established the GHGRP. Starting in 2010, the EPA began to collect greenhouse gas emissions 
data from all facilities and automotive fleets that emit 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent or more per year.  While the oil and gas extraction industry is required to report, 




facility operations across entire shale plays, which is a very large geographic area. This provides 
little information about the specific place where pollution occurs.  
 
A.1.3 Problems with Environmental Protection Agency Data Sources 
 
Information submitted to the EPA is limited, as specific industries are exempt from 
reporting to the EPA, the EPA fails to collect information on small producers, and information 
collected by the EPA on the oil and gas extraction industry is for large geographic areas, not 
specific points. The example below demonstrates limitations.  
 
Figure 6. Example Operator Oil and Gas Extraction Facility Span Across Texas Counties 
 
 
Source: Hiller, 2013 [Reprinted]. Reprinted with permission from “A 21st-Century oil boom in 
the Lone Star State; Texas has nearly half of all rigs in the United States” by Jennifer Hiller, 





The figure above shows Baker Hughes (a large oil and gas extraction company) oil rig 
counts for the various shale plays in Texas. Rigs are the mechanical devices used to extract oil 
and gas at a lease (i.e., it is a machine used at an oil and gas extraction facility). Emissions from 
these facilities would not be submitted to the EPA TRI because the oil and gas extraction 
industry is exempt. Baker Hughes would be required to submit a record to the EPA GHGRP for 
each of the separate shale formations if greenhouse gas emissions from rigs within the shale emit 
25,000 tons or more of greenhouse gases. For example, if the 21 rigs located in the 
Haynesville/Bossier Shale were estimated to emit 23,000 tons of greenhouse gases, it would not 
be required to report. On the other hand, say the 235 rigs in the Eagle Ford Shale emitted 25,000 
tons or more of greenhouse gasses, Baker Hughes would be required to submit a single report for 
all 235 rigs. Information is not broken down to the 235 facilities spread across the shale play. 
The specific locations of the facilities where emissions are occurring are not even collected. As 
such, using the EPA GHGRP, we cannot tell which communities are living near the oil and gas 
extraction facilities where pollution occurs.  
 
A.2 Measuring Community Environmental Risks 
 
Two key issues among sociologists quantifying environmental risks are: (1) how to 






A.2.1.1 Unit Hazard Coincident Approaches 
 
There are two key approaches to measuring proximity to environmental risks: the 
traditional unit hazard coincident approach, and the more modern, distance-based approach. 
Traditional environmental inequality analysis relied upon a unit hazard coincident 
approach. Classical studies examined whether or not a locally unwanted land use (LULU) was 
located within community boundaries (Bullard 1990; Mohai and Bryand 1992). In essence, this 
approach quantifies the characteristics of the immediate community in which the toxic facility is 
located, in comparison to those of the population not in the same immediate area.  The spatial 
relationship between the facility and the community is determined by overlaying community 
boundaries and facility points to determine the community in which the facility is located.  
 






However, the unit hazard coincident approach is problematic, especially for facilities 
located near boundary lines. The community effected by toxic facilities often goes beyond the 
man-made boundary in which the facility is located.  
 
A.2.1.2 Distance-Based Approaches 
 
More modern approaches to quantifying environmental inequality use geographic 
information technologies to determine the communities surrounding toxic facilities. The example 
below demonstrates a simple boundary intersection distance-based approach. This approach 
quantifies the characteristics of communities surrounding facilities by determining the 
communities whose boundaries are within a specific distance from the facility and aggregating 
community data. 
 






When comparing unit hazard coincidence and distance-based approaches, Mohai and Saha 
(2007) find distance-based approaches are robust and provide more precise estimates of 
communities exposed.  
 
A.2.2 Measuring Emissions 
 
Sociologists use various approaches to estimate the magnitude of industrial facility toxic 
emissions. While emission models are most commonly used, another approach is to use direct 
metering devices.  
 
A.2.1.1 Emission Models 
 
EPA GHGRP greenhouse gas emissions are estimated using a variety of different models. 
Some estimate emissions by examining fuel-specific data. Others simply multiply a default 
emission and heat factor by the amount of fuel used to estimate carbon dioxide, methane, and 
nitrous oxide emissions. 
 
A.2.1.2 Metering Devices 
 
Some facilities employ continuous monitoring systems located on flare stacks, which 
monitor toxic emission concentration and flow rate. While this provides the most precise 





A.3 Defining the Unit of Analysis in Community-Level Research 
 
Much debate revolves around the ideal unit of analysis when conducting community-
level environmental inequality research. Commonly used units of analysis (from largest 
geographic scale to smallest geographic scale) include county boundaries, zip code boundaries, 
Census tract boundaries, and Census block group boundaries.  
 
A.3.1 County Boundaries 
 
Counties are very large geographic areas commonly used in environmental inequality 
analysis. Below is a map of all Texas counties, with Brazos County highlighted. Brazos County 
is at the upper edge of the Eagle Ford Shale.  
 






In 2012, there were 254 counties in Texas. The mean county size was 1062 square miles with a 
standard deviation of 658 square miles.  
 
A.3.2 Zip Code and Census Tract Boundaries 
 
Since counties are so large, zip codes and Census tracts are more commonly used units of 
analysis in quantitative environmental inequality research. Zip codes and Census tracts are 
smaller geographic areas in comparison to counties, but still spread across a large geographic 
area. While Census tracts are contained within counties, zip codes can spread across counties. 
Below is a map of all zip codes and Census tracts within in Brazos County, with a single Census 
tract in West Downtown Bryan highlighted.  
 





In 2012, there were 2024 zip code areas in Texas. The mean zip code area was 115 
square miles with a standard deviation of 198 square miles. In 2012, there were 5313 Census 
tracts in Texas. The mean tract area was 51 square miles with a standard deviation of 210 square 
miles.  
 
A.3.3 Census Block Group and Block Boundaries 
 
Census block groups are much smaller than Census tracts and zip codes, and Census 
blocks are even smaller than block groups. Below is a map of the Census tract in West 
Downtown Bryan (which was highlighted in the previous map) and the Census blocks and block 
groups within the tract.  
 






As you can see, Census block groups and blocks are much smaller than tracts. The American 
Community Survey (ACS) provides detailed five-year community demographic and economic 
estimates at the block group level to the public. Block-level ACS community estimates are 
restricted and unreliable, as the ACS was sampled at a higher level of geography. In 2012, there 
were 15,799 Census block groups in Texas. The mean block group area was 17 square miles, 
with a standard deviation of 103 square miles. In 2012, there were 917,499 Census blocks in 
Texas. The mean block group area was .3 square miles with a standard deviation of 1.74 square 
miles.  
 
A.4 Conceptual Limitations of Community-Level Research 
 
In sum, environmental inequality research primarily focuses on the community as the unit 
of analysis. Electronically metered, distance based, block group-level approaches provide the 
most precise estimates of communities most affected by facility toxic emissions. However, with 
the community as the primary focus of environmental inequality, little attention is paid to how 
variation between facilities relates to environmental inequality. Instead, much of environmental 
inequality research conceptualizes all toxic facilities as the same. However, rural sociology 
research on disproportionality demonstrates a significant variation among facility emission rates 
within an industry (Freudenberg 2006). It is critical to use the facility, which is the producer of 
environmental inequality, as the unit of analysis so that we can better understand why some 






A.5 Bringing the Facility into Environmental Inequality Research 
 
A.5.1 Prior Research 
 
Much of environmental inequality research focuses on the community while overlooking 
toxic facilities themselves. However, because they are the producers of environmental inequality, 
Grant, Trautner, Downey and Thiebaud (2010) shift the focus to the industrial facility. Using 
novel fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis and the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) of 2,053 chemical industry plants in 2002, they 
find that community and facility characteristics combine to produce disproportionate pollution 
emissions. Facilities in Census tracts that are more black, more Hispanic, or have a greater 
percentage of the population employed in manufacturing, and facilities that have more 
employees or are branch plants are more likely to have highly risky emissions (Grant et.al 2010).  
While Grant et. al (2010)’s research involving the industrial facility in environmental 
inequality analysis is a critical advancement, it is methodologically limited in four key ways. 
First, the research relies upon the Environmental Protection Agency’s RSEI model. The RSEI 
model evaluates the environmental risk of a facility using information about chemicals reported 
to the EPA TRI, together with factors about the chemical’s toxicity and potential for human 
exposure. As described earlier, the EPA TRI is limited, as the only companies required to report 
are those that emit 25,000 tons of chemicals annually and have 10 or more full time employees. 
Since most organizations are small (Granovetter 1984), failing to include small organizations in 
their analysis limits the scope of their findings. Second, the research relies on a less precise 




coincident approach to determining the characteristics of communities surrounding facilities, as 
described earlier, a distance-based approach is much more precise. Third, the research relies on 
community information at the Census tract-level, which is a much larger geographic unit of 
analysis than the Census block group. Forth, Grant uses fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis methods to determine which combinations of facility and organizational characteristics 
best explain facility emissions. While this is an innovative method to conduct exploratory 
research, it is not theory driven, it is data driven. As such, it is more difficult to differentiate 
genuine relationships from spurious ones.  
 
A.5.2 My Approach 
 
I overcome previous limitations by taking a different approach. The approach taken in 
this project is inspired by Grant et. al (2010)’s work but makes up for methodological limitations 
to studying the oil and gas extraction industry. While Grant et. al (2010) relies upon the EPA 
TRI and RSEI model to determine emission point sources and emission volumes, my research 
uses the Texas Railroad Commission well surface location coordinates for all producing oil and 
gas extraction facilities and electronically metered oil and gas production and disposition 
volumes. Additionally, I employ a distance-based, block group method to determine the 
characteristics of communities most effected by oil and gas extraction facility venting and flaring 
volumes. Finally, I use a theory driven, quantitative regression model at the oil and gas 
extraction facility-level to determine how the characteristics of communities surrounding 
facilities are related to disproportionate emissions.  While my approach is briefly described 




A.5.2.1 Determining Emission Point Sources- Texas Railroad Commission Well Surface 
Location Coordinates 
 
While federal agencies do not collect the longitude and latitude coordinates on all oil and 
gas extraction wells, state agencies make this information available to the public, though 
sometimes at a cost. Wellbore surface location coordinates were obtained for all oil and gas wells 
from the Texas Railroad Commission. Prior to drilling in Texas, all companies are required to 
report wellbore surface locations to the Texas Railroad Commission. These wellbore surface 
locations were projected onto a map using a North American Datum 1983 State Plane Texas 
Central FIPS 4203 Feet.  While wellbore surface locations are available to the public though a 
GIS viewer, this information is not available to be downloaded and used to conduct 
comprehensive geographic and statistical analysis. As such, these coordinates were obtained 
through several Public Information Act requests to the Texas Railroad Commission. The Texas 
Railroad Commission required several thousands of dollars in processing fee payments (requests 
to waive the fee were denied), which were paid by the Texas A&M Sociology Department 
Graduate Research Award Committee.   
 
A.5.2.2 Measuring Proximity- A Distance-Based Approach 
 
 I employ a boundary intersection distance-based approach to quantify the characteristics 
of individuals and households living in Census block groups within one mile of the wellbore 
surface location. First, I projected wellbore surface locations and 2012 Census TIGER/Line 




4203 Feet. Then I drew a one-mile buffer around each wellbore surface location. Next, I overlaid 
the one-mile buffer with Census block group polygons. Finally, I aggregated the block group 
data by the unique oil and gas extraction facility identifier to quantify the characteristics of 
communities living in block groups within one mile of the facility.  I chose a one-mile buffer 
over other distances, as Moahi and Saha (2007) find it provides a more precise estimate and 
better fits the environmental inequality hypotheses.  
 
A.5.2.3 Measuring Emissions- Metered Volumes 
 
I obtained venting and flaring gas volumes in thousand cubic feet (at base pressure of 
14.65 pounds per square inch and base temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit) from the Texas 
Railroad Commission. Statewide Rules 27, 54 and 58(b) require all operators submit monthly 
production reports for each oil and gas extraction facility. Venting and flaring volumes obtained 
from thermal mass flow meters are required to be submitted on these monthly reports. For each 
oil and gas extraction facility, I aggregated the recorded volumes for each month of 2012. 
Metered volumes are better than operator estimates, as it minimizes human error.  
 
A.5.2.4 Defining the Unit of Analysis- Oil and Gas Extraction Facility 
 
While much research relies on the community as the unit of analysis, I rely upon the oil 
and gas extraction facility. The oil and gas extraction facility involves one or more wellbore 
surface locations located on the same lease of land. My research involves all producing oil and 






In this appendix, I review the analytical strategies behind the analysis of the communities 
most exposed to Texas oil and gas venting and flaring volumes in 2012. In essence, this appendix 
provides more details about the methods and findings underlying the research presented in 
section 3. 
 
B.1 Research Methods 
 
B.1.1 Units of Analysis, Population, and Sample 
 
 This study involves all producing Texas oil and gas extraction facilities within one mile 
of Texas Census block groups and Texas Census block groups in 2012. Two separate analysis 
are conducted at different units. One study focuses on the oil and gas extraction facility. The 
other study focuses on the Census block group. Analysis primarily focuses on all producing 
Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that submitted their monthly production and disposition 
report in 2012 that are within a mile of a Census block group with at least one American 
Community Survey five-year summary file block group estimate publicly released. This means 
that oil and gas extraction facilities not near residential populations or those within one mile of 
Census block groups with so few residents that estimates cannot be publicly released due to 
confidentiality reasons are not included in my analysis.   In 2012, there were 162,144 producing 
oil and gas extraction facilities and 126,862 were located within one mile of a block group with a 




population estimate. This means that 35,282 producing oil and gas extraction facilities were not 
included in the analysis because they were not located within one mile of a block group estimate, 
often because they were located near areas where there are no residents, such as airports, military 
training grounds, and off-shore. All Census block groups located in Texas with demographic 
characteristics publicly released in 2012 are also analyzed. In 2012, there were 15,810 census 
block groups in Texas and 15,771 had publicly released demographic estimates. This means that 
39 block groups were not included in the analysis because they had so few residents that 
estimates were not publicly released due to confidentiality reasons.   
 
B.1.2 Data Sources 
 
This study relies on four different sources: (1) Texas Railroad Commission database, (2) 
American Community Survey five-year summary file population estimates, (3) the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics database, and (4) Texas Statewide Imagery Political Boundaries 
shapefiles.  
 
B.1.2.1 Texas Railroad Commission Database 
 
Various datasets from the Texas Railroad Commission were used to map Texas oil and 
gas venting and flaring volumes. Datasets include the Production Data Query Dump, a 
programmed request GIS data extract, the Full Wellbore Query Data, the Drilling Permit Master 
and Trailer Plus Longitudes and Latitudes file, and Digital Map Information. These files were all 




coordinates. Fees to process Public Information Act requests for this information were paid by 
the Texas A&M University Sociology Department Graduate Research Award Committee. 
 
B.1.2.1 Production Data Query Dump 
 
This dataset is a complete dump of the Texas Railroad Commission production database. 
The production database contains all oil and gas production and disposition records submitted by 
all operating oil leases and gas wells each month since 1992. Organizations are required to report 
the actual electronically metered volumes of gas production and disposition and there are 
financial consequences for failing to correctly report. Accounting for lags in reporting, 
aggregated Texas Railroad Commission production estimates match Energy Information 
Administration state-level reports (EIA 2015). However, unlike Energy Information 
Administration state-level reports, the Texas Railroad Commission production dataset provides 
information necessary to link production and disposition data to the specific point location where 
production and disposition occurs. This dataset was received on May 4, 2016 a series of .dsv 
files. Two .dsv files from this dataset were used: OG_LEASE_CYCLE_DATA_TABLE.dsv and 
OG_LEASE_CYCLE_DISP_DATA_TABLE.dsv. The codebook for this dataset is available at 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/1286/pdqdump.pdf.  
 
B.1.2.1.2 Full Wellbore Query Data 
 
The Wellbore Query Data is necessary to connect the Production Data Query Dump with 




Railroad Commission assigned unique identifiers. This dataset provides the API numbers 
associated with particular Texas Railroad Commission lease and district numbers. This data was 
received on May 10, 2016 as a single test file: dbf600.txt. The codebook for this dataset is 
available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/24474/wba091_wellbore_october2014.pdf.  
 
B.1.2.1.3 Drilling Permit Master and Trailer Plus Longitudes and Latitudes Dataset 
 
 The Drilling Permit Master and Trailer Plus Longitudes and Latitude dataset contains 
information on every permit application submitted to drill or conduct production and disposition 
activities at an oil or gas well since 1976. All organizations drilling any type of oil or gas well 
must obtain and maintain an oil and gas permit. There are financial penalties associated with 
failure to maintain an oil and gas permit. The ASCII file is updated daily and contains drilling 
permit information and well completion and restriction information including GIS coordinates of 
all Texas oil and gas well surface locations referenced to North American Datum 1927 
(NAD27). This file was received on May 6, 2016 as a single .dat file: daf802_II.dat.gz. The 
codebook for this dataset is available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/20754/drilling-permit-
master-and-trailer-plus-latitudes-and-longitudes-user-manual.pdf.  
 
B.1.2.1.4 Programmed Request Data Extract 
 
Geographic coordinates in North American Datum 83 (NAD83) were also requested 





B.1.2.1.5  Digital Map Information 
 
Since there was still an incomplete match between production data and facility 
geographic coordinates, I finally obtained a complete match using well surface location 
coordinates from the Texas Railroad Commission Digital Map.  This dataset, received on 
January 11, 2017, came as a series of shape files (Shp001.zip, Shp003.zip, …, Shp507.zip) 
referenced to NAD83.The codebook for this dataset is available at 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/36706/digital-map-information-pdf.pdf.  
 
B.1.2.1.6 American Community Survey Five-Year Summary File Population Estimates, 
Geodatabase Format 
 
The 2010-2014 American Community Survey five-year population estimates geodatabase 
was used to obtain residential community information. The five-year population sample of 2010-
2014 is used because five-year estimates are recommended when examining areas with 
populations lower than 20,000 (Census Bureau 2015). American Community Survey data 
provides community demographic information at the block group-level. The geodatabase format 
of the American Community Survey brings together geography from the Census Topologically 
Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER)/Line Shapefiles and the American 
Community Survey five-year estimates in a Geographic Information System (GIS). The 






B.1.2.1.7 National Center for Charitable Statistics Database 
 
The National Center for Charitable Statistics database includes information about 
registered charitable organizations throughout the United States. Information about the number 
of registered nonprofit organizations found before 2012 in each Texas county was obtained using 
the database accessible at http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/geoCounties.php?q=TX.  
 
B.1.2.1.8 Texas Statewide Imagery Political Boundaries Shapefiles 
 
 In order to determine the county in which the oil and gas extraction facility is located, I 
used the Texas Statewide Imagery Political Boundaries geodatabase available at the Texas 
Natural Resources Information System data download page: https://tnris.org/data-
download/#!/statewide. The geodatabase (political-bnd_tx.zip) was downloaded on January 19, 
2017. The county boundary shapefile (StratMap_County_poly.shp) is referenced to NAD83. 
 
B.1.3 Detailed Measures 
 
Household income and home value categories are described in the tables below. These 




Table 5. Household Income Categories 
Category Household Income Range 
1 < $10,000 
2 $10,000 – $14,999 
3 $15,000 - $19,999 
4 $20,000 – $24,999 
5 $25,000 - $29,999 
6 $30,000 – $34,999 
7 $35,000 - $39,999 
8 $40,000 – $44,999 
9 $45,000 - $49,999 
10 $50,000 – $54,999 
11 $55,000 – $59,999 
12 $60,000 – $74,999 
13 $75,000 – $99,999 
14 $100,000 – $124,999 
15 $125,000 – $149,999 
16 $150,000 – $199,999 
17 > $200,000 
 
 
Table 6. Home Value Categories 
Category Home Value Range 
1 < $10,000 
2 $10,000 – $14,999 
3 $15,000 - $19,999 
4 $20,000 – $24,999 
5 $25,000 - $29,999 
6 $30,000 – $34,999 
7 $35,000 - $39,999 
8 $40,000 – $44,999 
9 $45,000 - $49,999 
10 $50,000 – $54,999 
11 $55,000 – $59,999 
12 $60,000 – $69,999 
13 $70,000 – $79,999 
14 $80,000 – $89,999 
15 $90,000 – $99,999 
16 $100,000 – $124,999 
17 $125,000 – $149,999 
18 $150,000 – $174,999 
19 $175,000 – $199,999 
20 $200,000 – $249,999 
21 $250,000 – $299,999 
22 $300,000 – $399,999 
23 $400,000 – 4399,999 
24 $500,000 – $749,999 
25 $750,000 – $999,999 




B.1.4 Connecting Texas Railroad Commission Datasets 
 
Data management started by connecting monthly venting and flaring volume records with 
production records. The lease-level production table was first connected to the lease-level 
monthly disposition table using a unique identifier made up of the oil/gas code, district number, 
lease number, month, and year. Once these files were connected, I kept only those for 2012, 
created an identifier made up of the oil/gas code, district number, lease number, and operator 
number, and found the volume of gas produced and dispose for each operator’s lease.  
Next, I connected the production and disposition query dump data with the full wellbore 
query data using an identifier made up of the oil/gas code, district number and lease number.  To 
do this, I had to first parse out the information for each table included within the given ascii file 
and re-connect the tables to obtain single rows of all wellbore information available within the 
file. Then, I removed all wellbores that were not active in 2012. Finally, I connected leases to 
their respective wellbores.  
After that, I connected the production and disposition data with the programmed request 
data using the API number. I also attempted to match production and disposition data with 
wellbore surface locations in the permit master file (which has wellbore surface locations in 
NAD27 format) using the API number. In order to do this, I first parsed out the information 
within the permit master file into various tables and re-connected the tables to obtain single rows 
of all wellbore information within the permit file. Finally, a complete match between production 
data and well coordinates was obtained by matching production data with the digital map 





B.1.5 Creating the Geographic Information System 
 
Other datasets were matched within a Geographic Information System, using the 
following steps. First, all geographic data (wellbore coordinates, American Community Survey 
block group shapefile, and Texas county boundaries shapefile) was added to the map and 
projected to North American Dam NAD83 State Plan Texas Central FIPS 4203 Coordinate 
System. Oil wellbore coordinate points were then grouped for each operator’s lease, representing 
numerous wellbore surface locations on the same lease. Oil lease and gas wells were overlaid 
with the county boundary file, and then matched to the National Center for Charitable Statistics 
county nonprofit organization information using the county name. Then, a one-mile buffer was 
drawn around oil lease multi-points and gas well points and then it was overlaid with the block 
group boundary file. Finally, American Community Survey estimate tables were connected to the 
block group-lease buffer overlay file using the block group number (I.e., geoid). Once the 
datasets were connected within the Geographic Information System, information was 
reconnected to production data and collapsed to create single facility and block group files.  
 
B.1.6 Data Analysis 
 
This research uses a zero-inflated negative binomial model in order to determine 
correlations between the amount of gas vented or flared and community characteristics. Negative 
binomial regression accounts for separate processes related to the of prediction the dependent 
variable at zero and elsewise. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression modeling is a three-step 




dependent variable for units that are not zero using a Poisson-gamma mixture distribution. 
Finally, it computes the observed probabilities as a mixture of the probabilities of the two 
different latent groups. Tobit, Ordinary Lease Squares, Poisson, zero-inflated Poisson, and 
negative binomial regression models were considered but not chosen due to problems with the 
violation of normality and heteroskedasticity assumptions. A zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression was chosen over Poisson, zero-inflated Poisson, and negative binomial regression 
models because the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model provided a better fit when 
comparing Akaike Information Criterion estimators. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial regression model first predicts whether a unit (i.e., 
block group or facility) is associated with zero gas vented or flared. Units with zero venting and 
flaring volumes are considered in “Group A”. The probability of being in “Group A” is estimated 
using the following equation:  
Pr (Ai = 1 | zi) = ѱi = F(𝑧𝑖ϒ) = 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(ϒ0+ ∑ 𝑧𝑘ϒ𝑘 )
𝑛
𝑘=1




Let Ai = 1 if the unit is in Group A, else Ai = 0, where ѱi  is the probability of being in Group A 
for unit i, zk is the inflation variable, ϒ0 is the intercept and ϒk represents regression coefficients. 
Then, among units that reported at least one mcf of gas vented or flared, the volume of 
gas vented or flared was estimated using the following equation: 













, where μi = exp (xiβ)  
Finally, the probabilities of zero and counts for those not zero are mixed together. The 
overall probability of a zero count is estimated as follows: 
Pr (yi = 0 | xi, zi) = ѱi  + {(1 - ѱi ) x Pr  (yi = 0 | xi, Ai = 0 )} 




Pr (yi = k | xi, zi) = (1 - ѱi ) x Pr  (yi = k | xi, Ai = 0 ) 
Finally, the following equation estimated the expected counts among those without a zero:  








In this appendix, I review the strategies behind the analysis of the types of facilities and 
operators most responsible for Texas oil and gas venting and flaring practices in 2012. In 
essence, this appendix provides more details about the methods and findings underlying the 
research presented in section 4. 
 
C.1 Research Method 
 
C.1.1 Units of Analysis, Population, and Sample 
 
 This study involves all producing Texas oil and gas extraction facilities that submitted 
their monthly production and disposition report in 2012 that are within a mile of a Census block 
group with at least one American Community Survey five-year summary file block group 
estimate publicly released, as in Appendix B. In addition, this study also involves the companies 
with direct ownership of the oil and gas extraction facility (i.e., the operator). In 2012, there were 
4,713 different operators in control of producing oil and gas extraction facilities.  
 
C.1.2 Data Sources 
 
In addition to the five different sources described in Appendix B, this study also relies on 
the following three sources: (1) additional Texas Railroad Commission datasets, (2) United 




Corporate Structure Information on LexisNexis and Google, and (4) restricted American 
Community Survey 2010-2014 microdata available to approved researchers at a Federal 
Statistical Research Data Center.  
 
C.1.2.1 Additional Texas Railroad Commission Datasets 
 
C.1.2.1.1 Organization Report (P-5) 
 
The Texas Railroad Commission Organization Report (P-5) dataset provides information 
on all organizations that have completed form P-5 required to legally engage in the oil and gas 
extraction industry business in Texas. Since 1981, organizations directly involved in oil and gas 
activities in Texas, including organizations involved in drilling, operating, or producing any oil 
or gas well, are required to file an organization report, Form P-5. This dataset is ideal because, to 
my knowledge, it is the only dataset that provides researchers with the capacity to link 
production and disposition at individual gas wells to specific operating companies.  
 
C.1.2.1.2 2012 Inspection Extract 
 
An extract of all inspections conducted by the Texas Railroad Commission in 2012 was 
received on June 25, 2016. This is an ideal dataset because it provides the most comprehensive 
information on inspection activities and when facilities violate state regulations. Since the state 
(not the federal government) is primarily responsible for regulating oil and gas extraction 




C.1.2.1.3 2012 Permit Extract 
 
An extract of all venting and flaring permits granted by the Texas Railroad Commission 
in 2012 was received on August 10, 2015. It includes information regarding approved flaring 
permits. This is an ideal dataset because it is maintained by the agency responsible for approving 
and tracking permits to vent and flare gas in Texas. 
 
C.1.2.2 United States Energy Information Administration Intrastate and Interstate Natural 
Gas Pipeline Shapefile 
 
 A shapefile of the natural gas interstate and intrastate pipelines as of January 1, 2012 is 
publicly available to be downloaded at www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.cfm. This dataset was 
collected by the EIA from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This dataset is 
ideal because it provides the most extensive map of all natural gas pipelines in the continental 
United States. Like the Census TIGER/Line shapefile, this shapefile datum is NAD83. 
 
C.1.2.3 Corporate Structure Information on Lexis Nexis and Google 
 
The Texas A&M University Sociology Department Graduate Research Award supported 
an outstanding undergraduate student, Garrison Reed Barrilleaux, to collect corporate structure 
information on the operators identified in the Texas Railroad Commission Organization Report 
Form. First, using the operator names listed in the Texas Railroad Commission Organization 




Database. Then, operators not identified in LexisNexis were searched on Google. All companies 
that could not be found on Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations that were found on Google were 
identified as private companies. The operators neither identified through Google or Lexis Nexis 
Corporate Affiliations are assumed to be small private companies or trusts without a 
multilayered subsidiary form.  
 
C.1.2.4 Restricted American Community Survey, 2010-2014, Microdata 
 
Restricted American Community Survey microdata was used to better quantify the 
remote communities surrounding facility locations.   
 
C.1.3 Connecting Texas Railroad Commission Datasets 
 
In addition to connecting the Texas Railroad Commission Datasets as described in 
Appendix B, the following steps were also taken. First, I parsed out and connected the 
Organization Report dataset to the production data dump using the operator number. Then I 
connected both the permit extract and inspection extract to the production data query dump using 
the district number, lease name and operator number.  
 
C.1.4 Connecting Texas Railroad Commission Information with Other Datasets 
 
To connect facility points to the nearest pipeline, I build upon the Geographic 




Information Administration Interstate and Intrastate Natural Gas Pipeline shapefile to the 
geodatabase and projecting it to North American Dam NAD83 State Plan Texas Central FIPS 
4203 Coordinate System. Then, I used the nearest distance tool to find the nearest distance (in 
feet) between facility wellbore surface locations and pipeline established as of January 1, 2012.  
To connect restricted Census microdata to public data, I first used population weights and 
individual and household responses to develop block group-level counts. Then, using block 
group identifiers, I connected Census block group estimates to facility identifiers. Next, I 
aggregated the characteristics of block groups within one mile of the facility location. Finally, I 
developed summary statistics, such as counts, percentages and medians, to quantify the 
characteristics of communities within one mile of each facility.  
 
C.1.5 Data Analysis 
 
This research uses a two-part/hurdle model in order to determine correlations between 
facility and operator characteristics and both (1) whether, among all producing oil and gas 
extraction facilities, the facility vented or flared (i.e., participation), and (2) the venting and 
flaring rate among facilities that vented or flared (i.e., magnitude). The final model accounts for 
the clustering of standard errors by facility operator. A two-part model accounting for the 
clustering of standard errors by facility operator was chosen over a multi-level model for two 
reasons: (1) because there is not enough variation at level one to run a multi-level regression 
model, and (2) because multi-level regression model outcomes are very similar to regression 
model outcomes that account for the clustering of standard errors. Using Stata’s vce (cluster) 




data is clustered. To ensure that operators with many facilities are not under sampled, clustered 
sandwich variance estimators were produced rather than simply sampling one facility for each 
operator.  
 
C.1.6.1 Participation Generalized Linear Model 
 
The first part of the model (i.e., the participation model) investigates the direct effects of 





) =  𝛾0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑀𝑘𝑗 − 𝑀𝑘𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
𝐾
𝑘=1 +   𝑒𝑗, 𝑤here 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗 ≈ N (0,𝜎𝑒
2)  
In the full participation model above, 𝜑1𝑗 denotes the probability that lease j vented or flared; 𝛾0 
denotes the average log odds that a lease will vent or flare; 𝛽𝑘 is the corresponding coefficient 
that represents the direction and strength of the explanatory variable (k is the number of variables 
at the lease-level); 𝑀𝑘𝑗 is the observation of the explanatory variable k for lease j, and 𝑀𝑘̅̅ ̅̅  is the 
mean of the explanatory variable k; 𝑒𝑗 represents the random error, which is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance of 𝜎𝑒
2. 
 
C.1.6.2 Magnitude Generalized Linear Mixed Model 
 
The second part of the model (i.e., the magnitude model) investigates the direct effects of 
lease, and operator characteristics on the venting or flaring rate for leases that vented or flared 




log(𝐸[𝜑2𝑗 | 𝜑2𝑗 > 0]) =  𝛾0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑀𝑘𝑗 − 𝑀𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝑒𝑗, 𝑤here 𝑒𝑗  ≈ N (0,𝜎𝑒
2) 
In the full magnitude model above, 𝜑2𝑗 denotes the venting or flaring rate at lease j; 𝛾0 denotes 
the average venting or flaring rate of all leases that vented or flared; 𝛽𝑘 is the corresponding 
coefficient that represents the direction and strength of the explanatory variable (k is the number 
of different explanatory variables in the model); 𝑀𝑘𝑗 is the observation of the explanatory 
variable k for lease j, and 𝑀𝑘̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean of the explanatory variable k; 𝑒𝑗 represents the random 
error, which is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance of 𝜎𝑒
2.  
